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ABSTRACT 
Choosing Green: Explaining Motivations Across Different Environmental Behaviors 
by 
Alexander Howard DeGolia 
 
 In this dissertation, I ask a series of questions regarding why people perform different 
environmental behaviors and how environmental communication can influence individuals’ 
actions and opinions. The first chapter uses a broader range of basic values to explain why 
people participate in many types of political action. Using a nationally representative sample 
of US adults, I identify several patterns connecting political actions to individuals’ values. 
One central value that explains many political actions is concern for others (i.e. self-
transcendence); I find that people who prioritize this value are more likely to engage in 
nearly all types of political behavior evaluated, but are no more likely to vote. People who 
value traditional social norms (i.e. conservation) are more likely to vote, but are less likely to 
participate in other ways. This indicates a major distinction between voting and other types 
of participation like contacting elected officials, attending demonstrations, and others. Two 
other central values, concern for one’s own well-being and pursuit of excitement, do not 
consistently influence political participation. 
 In chapter two, I begin by evaluating the structure and psychological drivers of 
different types of behaviors specifically related to environmental protection. To do so, I 
collected a large (N=1077) sample of Californians via Qualtrics that was representative of 
the California population in terms of income, education, and party identification. Whereas 
existing literature suggests three categories of environmental behavior, my survey analysis 
shows the presence of as many as six distinct types of common environmental behaviors. 
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These behavioral types include household environmental conservation, green consumer 
behaviors, support for environmental policies, communications to promote environmental 
policies, involvement with environmental advocacy organizations, and attendance at 
environmental rallies. After establishing statistical and theoretical distinctions between these 
types of environmental behavior, I show that individual’s values influence which behaviors 
people engage in, and that collectively values exert the largest influence on relatively low-
cost, non-activist environmental behaviors.  
 In the third chapter, I apply lessons from chapters 1 and 2 to study the influence 
different messages can have on public support for an environmental management project. To 
do so, I fielded a survey experiment (N=1077) in which messages describing a proposed 
invasive species management project differed both based on whether their primary impacts 
would be to provide ecological or economic benefits, and differed based on whether those 
benefits were framed as providing future gains or preventing future losses. I found that 
ecological- and loss-framed messages were more effective than either economic- or gain-
framed messages when communicating the value of invasive species management. The 
results suggests that communicating how policies influence people (i.e. via economic co-
benefits) may not be the most effective strategy in all cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In this dissertation, I ask a series of questions regarding why people perform different 
environmental behaviors and how environmental communication can influence individuals’ 
actions and opinions. A central focus of the first two chapters of this dissertation is how 
individuals’ values help explain decisions regarding which types of political behavior people 
choose to engage in. In the course of doing so, I show that our closely-held values animate 
decisions to perform behaviors that have both personal and social consequences. It is 
important to very clearly outline how the vocabulary of values is used throughout this 
dissertation. In the first chapter, I reference individuals’ self-transcendence, self-
enhancement, conservation, and openness to change values. These four values are part of the 
theory of basic values (Schwartz 1977, 1992), which has been used in hundreds of studies 
around the world, to the extent that many scholars refer to them as “universal.” In the second 
chapter, the language of values changes, in particular from self-transcendence and self-
enhancement to altruism, biospherism (i.e. altruism toward non-humans), and egoism. This is 
an artifact of the literatures that each of these chapters speaks to, but the values are no less 
universal and are measured in the same ways. 
 The first chapter uses these four basic values to explain why people participate in 
many types of political action. Using a nationally representative sample of US adults, I 
identify several patterns connecting political actions to individuals’ values. One central value 
that explains many political actions is concern for others (i.e. self-transcendence); I find that 
people who prioritize this value are more likely to engage in nearly all types of political 
behavior evaluated, but are no more likely to vote. People who value traditional social norms 
(i.e. conservation) are more likely to vote, but are less likely to participate in other ways. This 
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indicates a major distinction between voting and other types of participation like contacting 
elected officials, attending demonstrations, and others. Two other central values, concern for 
one’s own well-being and pursuit of excitement, do not consistently influence political 
participation. 
 In chapter two, I begin by evaluating the structure and psychological drivers of 
different types of behaviors specifically related to environmental protection. To do so, I 
collected a large (N=1077) sample of Californians via Qualtrics that was representative of 
the California population in terms of income, education, and party identification. Whereas 
existing literature suggests three categories of environmental behavior, my survey analysis 
shows the presence of as many as six distinct types of common environmental behaviors. 
These behavioral types include household environmental conservation, green consumer 
behaviors, support for environmental policies, communications to promote environmental 
policies, involvement with environmental advocacy organizations, and attendance at 
environmental rallies. After establishing statistical and theoretical distinctions between these 
types of environmental behavior, I show that individual’s values influence which behaviors 
people engage in, and that collectively values exert the largest influence on relatively low-
cost, non-activist environmental behaviors.  
 In the third chapter, I apply lessons from chapters 1 and 2 to a study of the impact of 
messages that highlight ecological or economic benefits of a specific environmental 
management project on public support for the project. To do so, I fielded a survey 
experiment (N=1077) to test how message frames that highlight the economic and ecological 
advantages of environmental management influence opinion regarding a proposed invasive 
species management project. Ecological- and loss-framed messages related to an important 
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were more effective than either economic- or gain-framed messages when communicating 
the value of invasive species management. As a result, identifying other reasons for pro-
environmental government policies (i.e. co-benefits) like economic growth or national 
security is neither necessary nor effective. Invasive species management shares 
characteristics with a broad range of environmental issues, and I expect that these results may 
be used to help inform future environmental communications research and as a practical 
resource for environmental managers and to help informing future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Beyond the Altruistic Voter: 
Effects of Individuals’ Values on Diverse Political Action  
 
Alexander H DeGolia 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
September 11, 2017 
 
Abstract 
This study evaluates the psychological drivers of individuals’ participatory choices. Most 
research regarding the role that values play in explaining political behavior examines the 
comparative impacts of self-interest and altruism on voting behaviors. This paper uses a 
broader range of values to explain why people participate in many types of political action. I 
identify several patterns connecting political actions to individuals’ deeply held values. I find 
that people who prioritize this value are more likely to engage in nearly all types of political 
behavior evaluated, but are no more likely to vote. People who value traditional social norms 
are more likely to vote, but are less likely to participate in other ways. while voting has no 
relationship with concern for others. This indicates a major distinction between voting and 
other types of participation like contacting elected officials, attending demonstrations, and 
others. Two other central values, concern for one’s own well-being and pursuit of 
excitement, do not consistently influence political participation. 
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Introduction 
Why people participate remains an enduring and essential question in the study of 
politics. People often feel that political participation provides an opportunity to express who 
they are and what they care about, and to endeavor to create a society that more closely 
aligns with their personal and social interests and concerns. The individual considerations 
that underlie these interests and concerns are values; values define our personal and social 
goals and motivate behaviors that align with those goals. Existing research connecting 
political participation with values focuses primarily on how individuals’ self-interests or 
societal interests each influence our calculus regarding whether or not to participate, 
frequently through evaluation of voter turnout rates (Funk 2000; Chong 1996; Fowler and 
Kam 2007). Models of participation based on self-interest, most notably rational choice 
theory, begin from the premise that people act based on what is best for themselves, and that 
all behaviors – even those that appear to be motivated by social interest – are fundamentally 
tied to the actor’s own well-being (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Aldrich 1993; 
Monroe 1991). Models of participation based on social interest, on the other hand, argue that 
social values lead people to participate in when doing so provides an opportunity to help 
others, or to create a society that benefits more people generally (e.g. Fowler and Kam 2007; 
Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007).  
To understand how values influence political participation in a more comprehensive 
way, it is important to both look beyond the motivational distinction between selflessness and 
selfishness. The theory of basic values (Schwartz 1977, 1992, 2012), which has been applied 
extensively in social psychology research, identifies a set of universal, comprehensive value 
dimensions, each of which expresses different broad individual goals. Political actions are 
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constrained and motivated by how people prioritize their values in the context of a given 
situation that presents an opportunity for participation. In addition, it is important to evaluate 
the effects of values on many types of political actions, not just voting. This is because 
political participation is far from monolithic, and how political actions are constrained and 
motivated not only depends on individuals’ values, but also which behaviors are being 
evaluated. While the aggregate of participatory decisions is often interpreted as a single 
measure of whether someone participates politically, when we participate we make a series 
of distinct decisions. In other words, citizens “must not only choose to act politically, but also 
choose how to act” (Leighley 1995: 198). In this study, I analyze the effects of individuals’ 
basic values on five common political behaviors including campaign volunteering, contacting 
elected officials, participation in political protest, donating to political causes, and 
membership in political organizations.  
Using a representative sample of US adults from the Measuring Morality Survey 
(N=1519; Vaisey 2012), I develop a series of models to evaluate the relationships between 
values and political participation. In addition to concern for oneself and concern for others, 
Schwartz (1992, 2010) identified two other broad value orientations: tradition and 
conformity, and pursuit of excitement and new experiences. Results from this study indicate 
that people who are primarily concerned with helping others engage in nearly all types of 
political actions, but are no more likely to vote or to volunteer on political campaigns than 
people who do not prioritize concern for others. This result suggests that participation, 
particularly non-electoral participation, is perceived as a means of helping other people, 
which is consistent with past findings. Mediation analysis also showed that people who 
valued others’ well-being were also more likely to participate because they were more 
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interested in and attentive to politics. People who prioritize their own self-interest were found 
to be no more or less likely to participate in politics, which contributes to the ongoing debate 
regarding whether self-interest tends to drive people away from political participation or 
instead underlies all such participation. People who value conformity and tradition were 
found to be more likely to vote, but less likely to engage in nearly all other forms of 
participation. Finally, People who pursue exciting experiences were no more or less likely to 
participate than others, indicating that excitement or pleasure gained from the act of 
participating is not a primary motivating force for political participation.  
Results suggest a major distinction between voting and other types of political 
participation. Voting appears to be motivated by the desire to fulfill one’s duty as a citizen, 
while other behaviors appear motivated by a desire to help other people. The study 
demonstrates the importance of individuals’ values for how and why they participate in 
politics. 
Individual Values, Motivations, and Political Action 
How Values Motivate Behavior 
Values are “the vocabulary” of individuals’ goals and motivations as they relate to 
both their personal and social lives (Schwartz 2010: 223). Values define what is most 
important to us, and they are fundamental to who we are and how we think of ourselves 
(Allport 1961; Rokeach 1973; Bardi and Schwartz 2003). Values are both more abstract and 
more stable than norms (i.e. what one ought to do) and attitudes (i.e. personal feelings or 
beliefs), both of which are the subjects of specific objects – behaviors or situations, for 
example (Schwartz 2010). However, while the abstract nature of values means they transcend 
behavior and context and remain fairly consistent over the course of one’s life (Rokeach 
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1973; Roccas et al. 2002; Schwartz and Bardi 1997; Feather 1985), values nonetheless guide 
how we act and what we think regarding policy issues, people, and ourselves (Schwartz 
2010: 223). The process by which basic values influence our actions, including political 
actions, involves four basic steps: awareness of the need to act to resolve some problem or 
concern; awareness of actions that could relieve that need; belief in one’s own ability to 
address that need; and the sense of a responsibility to act (Schwartz 2010). How people 
prioritize different values dictates how they confront each of these steps toward action, and 
“actions become more attractive, and more valued subjectively, to the extent that they 
promote attainment of valued goals” (Schwartz 2010: 231; Feather 1985). 
The theory of basic values was developed with the intention of identifying a set of 
universal values shared across cultures and around the world (Schwartz 1977, 1992, 2012). 
The result is a system consisting of four motivationally-distinct values dimensions that has 
been tested in more than 200 samples across 67 countries. These four values are self-
transcendence, self-enhancement, openness to change, and conservation. Self-transcendent 
values lead to beliefs and behaviors that improve others’ well-being. Self-enhancement 
values lead people to choose actions and beliefs that promote personal status and benefits. 
Openness to change values lead to actions that provide new or exciting opportunities. 
Conservation values are associated with actions that conform to existing norms and 
traditions. Self-transcendence and conservation values most commonly influence how 
individuals care about, interpret, and act on societal issues (i.e. our “macro-worries”; 
Schwartz 2010). Self-enhancement and openness to change, on the other hand, most 
commonly influence the way we think about and act on our personal issues (i.e. our “micro-
worries”; Schwartz 2010). 
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Most political participation research argues that people participate in politics based 
their access to a combination of personal and social resources to explain how engaged people 
are in politics. The most common representation of this type of participatory model is the 
Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM; Verba et al. 1995; Brady et al. 1995), which argues that 
people are more likely to be political active when they have greater access to both personal 
resources and participatory opportunities – in particular time, money, skills, and networks of 
recruitment. This model has proved extremely powerful in terms of its ability to explain 
whether or not someone given a particular profile would be likely to participate in politics. 
However, because it does not address why individuals make specific behavioral decisions, 
the CVM and similar participatory models do not effectively explain why people participate 
in politics, and in particular why the might engage in different types of political behaviors. 
By incorporating values into a model that relies on many of the same explanatory variables 
as the CVM, I argue that those models are able to do more than past research to explain why 
people participate in a variety of political actions. In doing so, an important consideration is 
that political behaviors differ based on the personal costs required to perform them (Whiteley 
1995; Newman and Bartels 2010). It is possible that high-cost participation requires stronger 
normative motivations than low-cost participation, which would suggest risky or effortful 
actions like attending demonstrations, volunteering for campaigns, and membership in 
political organizations would have stronger association with individuals’ values. However, 
the absence of existing work on the topic makes these connections speculative.  
There are several mechanisms by which values might influence political participation. 
The first and most clear is the direct influence that values exert on behaviors: political 
behaviors offer individuals opportunities to achieve personal or social goals expressed by 
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those values, and so people engage in those behaviors in pursuit of those goals. Values may 
also influence political behaviors indirectly, through altering psychological engagement with 
politics (Augemberg 2008; Verplanken and Holland 2002). Psychological political 
engagement is the level of interest and knowledge a citizen has about politics, and is typically 
operationalized through measures of political interest and exposure to political 
communications. People who are more interested in or knowledgeable about politics tend to 
be more politically active (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba et al. 
1995; Cohen et al. 2001; Krosnick et al. 2009; Augemberg 2008; Burns, Schlozman, and 
Verba. 2001; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Verba et al. 1991; Conway 1991; 
McCluskey et al. 2004). As a result, to the extent that values influence psychological 
engagement with politics, they may indirectly influence political actions. The different means 
by which values influence political participation are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 It is worth keeping in mind several considerations regarding the relationships between 
values and political participation analyzed in this study. First, there are many ways to 
measure values and other normative influences on political behavior, and this study only 
evaluates one such way of measuring values. While the theory of basic values represents a 
well-established method for measuring values in a way that strives to be both comprehensive 
and universal, using the theory of basic values represents a choice. Moreover, as compared to 
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most other research regarding the relationship between values and participation, the values 
used in this study are less proximate to why people participate in politics than their political 
beliefs and ideologies. Nonetheless, the advantages of using basic values are significant. 
Doing so provides opportunities to understand how different people – that is, people who 
have significantly different personal and social goals, and prioritize different values in 
accordance with those goals – engage with the political system differently. In addition, the 
research design used in this study assesses correlations between values and political 
behavior. It does not attempt to manipulate individuals’ values, which might provide more 
information regarding how values cause political behavior. So while individual values are 
motivational in nature, it is impossible to definitively identify how values motivate political 
participation given the design of the study.  
 The next several sections build theoretical arguments about the relationships between 
each value and different political actions, and suggest how these might motivate these actions 
differently. An overview of my hypotheses regarding direct relationships between values and 
participation, which are developed in detail below, is shown in Table 1. 
 
Self-Transcendence and Political Action 
People who value self-transcendence are deeply concerned with others’ well-being. 
This concern may be focused toward specific groups like family and close friends, or toward 
people generally (Schwartz 1977, 1992, 2012). Political actions are often perceived as pro-
social – providing a chance to help others – even if doing so comes at personal cost 
Table 1.1: Hypotheses of Direct E↵ects of Values on Participation
Vote Volunteer Contact Pol Demonstrate Donate Pol Org
Self-Transcendence + + + + + +
Self-Enhancement none none none none none none
Openness to Change none + + + none +
Conservation + - - - - -
Table 1.2: Hypotheses of Indirect E↵ects of Values on Participation
Political Interest Political Attention
Self-Transcendence + +
Self-Enhancement - -
Openness to Change + +
Conservation none none
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Political Behaviors Measured
Rate of Behavior Standard Deviation
Vote 84.5% 36.2%
Volunteer 5.0% 21.7%
Contact Politician 17.7% 38.1%
Demonstration 4.1% 19.8%
Donate 12.1% 32.6%
Political Organization 3.8% 19.1%
At Least Two Actions 27.3% 44.5%
All Six Actions 0.6% 7.8%
Average Number of Actions 1.31 1.03
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(Schwartz 2007; Caprara and Steca 2007). As a result, people who prioritize self-
transcendence values are more likely to participate in a variety of ways, including voting, 
signing petitions, and attending protests, among others (Schwartz 2012; Panagopoulos 2010; 
Fowler and Kam 2007; Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; Fowler 2006; Finkel, Muller, and 
Opp 1989; Finkel and Opp 1991; Knack 1992; Jankowski 2002, 2007; Schwartz 2007; 
Vyrost, Kentos, and Fedakova 2007; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010; Vecchione et 
al. 2015; Augemberg 2008). As a result, I anticipate that self-transcendence values will be 
associated with increased likelihood of engaging in all types of political action evaluated.  
However, self-transcendence values should not explain all political behaviors equally. 
Political actions that involve direct citizen involvement like contacting elected officials, 
volunteering, signing petitions, attending demonstrations, donating money, and working with 
political organizations require citizens to play an active role in their political system. This 
may in turn require additional motivations associated with greater opportunities to help other 
people. Compared to other political actions evaluated, voting is a “superficial and relatively 
passive activity,” and requires relatively little effort and low psychological engagement 
(Ehrlich 2000; quoted from Augemberg 2008; Newman and Bartels 2010). Voting is also the 
most traditional and normative form of political behavior, and many people vote based 
largely on habit or a feeling that it is their duty (Dalton 2008a, 2008b; Riker and Ordeshook 
1968; Blais 2000; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003). Most research on the subject indicates 
that voting is perceived as a means of helping others, and that self-transcendent values 
increase voter turnout (Fowler and Kam 2007; Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; Jankowski 
2002, 2007). However, there are both strong theoretical arguments for why voting may be 
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less reliant on self-transcendent values than other forms of political behavior, and empirical 
research showing self-transcendence values are associated with increased voting rates. 
Evaluating the relationship between self-transcendence values and political behavior 
also provides an opportunity to understand how different types of concern for others 
influence political participation. Self-transcendence values consist of both concern for other 
people generally (i.e. universalism) and concern for specific in-groups (i.e. benevolence).1 
Existing experimental research on the subject shows that universalism is more important to 
both voting and other political participation than benevolence (Fowler and Kam 2007). 
Analysis in this study tests those results by applying the most established measures of 
universalism and benevolence to a large and representative sample of US adults. In line with 
previous work, I anticipate that people oriented toward universalism will be more likely to 
participate in all political actions than people oriented toward benevolence. 
Self-Enhancement and Political Action 
Self-enhancement values lead people to prioritize personal well-being and individual 
resources. The effects of prioritizing self-enhancement on political participation, however, 
are complex and existing research provides conflicting accounts. One possibility is that 
sensitivity to personal well-being leads people to avoid participation when costs are high 
relative to expected utility. Rational choice theorists have long suggested that people employ 
a “calculus of voting” in determining whether to participate (Downs 1957; Riker and 
Ordeshook 1968; Aldrich 1993), in which potential actors evaluate whether the personal cost 
of participating in terms time or effort will exceed the expected utility of participation.  
																																								 																				
1 In other research, universalism and benevolence may be referred to as altruism and social identification. The 
concepts are identical. 
   14 
In rare cases, people may legitimately expect that benefits caused by their 
participation would outweigh the cost of involvement (Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and 
Funk 1991). For example, seniors are more likely to contact their elected representatives if 
they are dependent on social security (Campbell 2002), and homeowners are more supportive 
of restrictions on property taxes (Sears and Citrin 1982). However, these cases typically 
involve specific policy issues that had the potential to influence their material well-being 
(Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001). In most cases, however, the material impact of 
participation in pursuit of a preferred candidate or policy is likely to be relatively small, and 
the probability of an individual actually influencing political outcomes approaches zero 
(Aldrich 1993; Downs [1957] 1985; Fowler and Kam 2007; Chong, Citrin, and Conley 
2001). As a result, even when individuals have strong personal preferences for certain 
political outcomes the cost of engagement usually exceeds expected benefits. In this narrow 
framework of the calculus of voting, the sensitivity to personal welfare associated with self-
enhancement values would make participation less desirable, diminishing macro-level 
concerns over the well-being of society as a whole and in turn leading people who prioritize 
self-enhancement to be less likely to participate in politics (Augemberg 2008; Schwartz 
2010). 
A more expansive definition of self-interest can lead to different conclusions 
regarding how attentiveness to individual well-being influences participatory decisions. 
Starting at least with Tocqueville, “self-interest rightly understood” has been noted as a 
motivation for individual participation in American democracy (Tocqueville 1835). Based on 
Tocqueville’s definition of self-interest, people participate in politics at least in part because 
they understand that their own stake is connected to that of others. If people understand their 
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self-interest this way, self-enhancement values may not necessarily make participation less 
desirable. People may also act in self-interested ways that reflect internalized social values, 
such as the satisfaction associated with fulfilling one’s responsibility to vote (Almond and 
Verba [1963] 2015; Aldrich 1993). When the expressive utility of fulfilling one’s duty as a 
citizen or otherwise affirming one’s political identity are incorporated into self-interest, then 
rational choice models become much more expansive and powerful for explaining 
participation. People may also participate in ways that do not offer direct material benefits, 
but can nonetheless be beneficial to the individual. For example, pro-social behaviors can 
offer reputational benefits (Ostrom 1998; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Chong 1992). People 
who engage in political behaviors may be perceived by peers as unselfish and valuable to the 
community, which offers significant individual benefits (Chong 1992). Internalization of 
self-interest in this way is exemplified by the influence of visibility on prosocial behavior. 
People are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors if those behaviors are more visible, 
even when the expected material benefits of those behaviors are outweighed by personal 
costs (Brick, Sherman, and Kim 2017; Nettle et al. 2013). A thorough understanding of the 
effects of self-interest on political participation is complicated by conflicting definitions of 
what self-interest means in the context of collective, prosocial behaviors. Most evidence 
suggests that strictly material self-interest does not explain political participation. However, 
other potentially self-interested motivations, like conceptions of broad, long-term self-
interest or social or reputational benefits, may do more to explain participation.  
To understand how self-enhancement may influence different behaviors, I primarily 
focus on expected costs of engaging in those behaviors as compared to potential benefits – 
material or otherwise – of those behaviors. For this study, it is important to clearly 
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distinguish the relationship between self-enhancement values and participation from the 
relationship between self-interest, either narrowly or broadly defined, and political 
participation. Self-enhancement values describe not whether a person perceives potential 
personal benefit from a specific political action, but rather whether that person is generally 
inclined to pursue behaviors that offer personal benefits like power, authority, or wealth. 
Voting is the least costly behavior of those analyzed, and therefore is unlikely to have a 
negative relationship with self-enhancement values. Other behaviors are costlier, but may be 
perceived as offering greater material, social, or reputational benefits. Volunteering, 
demonstrating, and membership in political organizations are all costly in terms of time and 
effort. However, they are also highly visible and offer opportunities for social interaction, 
and thus may offer personal benefits that are commensurate with these high costs. Donating 
money to political organizations is clearly personally costly, but may also be used to improve 
one’s reputation, curry favor, or influence at the policy level in pursuit of personal benefits 
(Becker 1973, Claessens, Jeijen, and Laeven 2006). Contacting elected officials is not visible 
to peers and so should not offer potential social or reputational benefits. However, people 
often contact politicians for assistance with government benefits (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995).  
There are strong arguments, presented above, for why people inclined to look after 
their own self-interest might either avoid or seek out different political actions. Given these 
conflicting motivations, it is difficult to establish clearly defined expectations regarding the 
relationships between self-enhancement and many different types of participation that 
involve different costs and potential benefits. 
Openness to Change and Political Action 
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People who value openness to change prioritize their own autonomy and 
independence, as well as exciting and new experiences. Although openness to change tends 
to motivate personal rather than social goals, in some cases political participation offers 
“excitement and chances to meet, work, and socialize with other individuals,” though doing 
so comes with “financial, temporal, and psychological risk” (Kam 2012: 818). People who 
value openness to change are more likely to accept risk in exchange for opportunities for 
novel or exciting experiences, and will therefore be more likely to participate in ways that 
offer those experiences (Vyrost, Kentos, and Fedakova 2007; Vecchione et al. 2015).  
However, different types of political participation offer varying opportunities for 
excitement, and perceptions about how exciting behaviors are should moderate the 
relationship between openness to change and political participation. Participation in 
demonstrations, involvement with political groups, and signing petitions are all associated 
with acceptance of greater risk, and the potential for greater excitement, than other behaviors 
like voting (Kam 2012). Volunteering on political campaigns likely also offers opportunities 
for excitement and social interaction. As a result, I expect that people who prioritize 
openness to change values will be more likely to participate in demonstrations, be involved 
with political organizations, contact elected officials, and volunteer on political campaigns. 
However, more banal political actions that do not offer the same kind of excitement, in 
particular voting and donating money to political causes, may not offer the same 
opportunities for excitement (Kam 2012), and so I do not expect these behaviors to be 
associated with openness to change.  
Conservation and Political Action 
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Conservation values lead people to prioritize tradition, maintenance of the status-quo, 
and personal security. People who value conservation are committed to group customs and 
are “especially sensitive to social norms and constraints,” which means that conservation is 
highly relevant to macro-level considerations (Schwartz 2010: 232). Voting is the most 
strongly normative political behavior, because of its historical importance and perception as a 
bedrock of democratic systems (see e.g. Almond and Verba [1963] 2015; Patemen 1970). 
One primary reason that citizens vote is because they feel it is their duty to do so (Dalton 
2008a, 2008b; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Blais 2000). A clear example of the relationship 
between citizen responsibility and voting is the extensive use of social pressure messages to 
increase voter turnout (Green and 2010; Gerber and Rogers 2009; Gerber, Green, and 
Larimer 2008). I expect that people who prioritize conservation values will be more sensitive 
to social norms, which should strengthen the belief in the duty to vote and make them more 
likely to vote. 
Since people oriented toward conservation are deeply concerned with maintaining 
tradition and the status quo, they may be less willing participate in other political actions that 
are not as strongly associated with traditional social norms. Some political behaviors, such as 
political protest or membership in a political group, may be perceived as risky, subversive, or 
otherwise disruptive to the existing social order. For example, dutiful citizenship norms 
decrease the likelihood that people engage in these sorts of political actions (Dalton 2008a). 
As a result, I expect that conservation values will make people less likely to participate in 
behaviors that may be perceived as disruptive to traditional political norms, including 
participation in demonstrations and political group membership. It is possible that political 
actions that are not overtly subversive may be perceived as disruptive to accepted social 
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norms as well. However, without existing evidence of this, I do not anticipate that 
conservation will have negative effects on such behaviors, including campaign volunteering, 
contacting elected officials, or donating to political organizations.   
Values and Political Participation Mediated Through Psychological Engagement 
One important way that values can influence political participation is by changing 
people’s psychological engagement with politics, which I define as political interest and 
knowledge. Some previous studies have evaluated psychological engagement as a type of 
passive political behavior (Augumberg 2008); however, it is more appropriately treated as a 
contributing factor to political participation, rather than as a type of participation itself. 
Political interest plays a prominent role in explaining many types of participation (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Abrams 1994; Huddy 2001), and inclusion of psychological 
factors in common socio-economic- and resource-based models has been shown to increases 
the power of participatory models (Cohen et al. 2001).  
Values influence people’s psychological engagement with politics through increasing 
how interested in, attentive to, and knowledgeable they are about politics and policy issues 
(Augemberg 2008; Verplanken and Holland 2002). People desire to develop the skills that 
allow them to effectively express their values and are more likely to believe they possess the 
ability to act in ways that do so (Caprara and Steca 2007). Because people who are more 
psychologically engaged with politics are more likely to participate (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995; Abrams 1994; Huddy 2001), I expect that individuals’ basic values will in part 
explain political participation mediated through psychological engagement. This is 
represented in Figure 1 by the path from psychological engagement to political participation. 
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Different values have potentially different effects on psychological engagement with 
politics. For example, people who value self-transcendence are not only more likely to 
participate in politics, but also more likely to believe their participation has the capacity to 
help people (Caprara and Steca 2007; Schwartz 2010). As a result, people who value self-
transcendence are also more likely to seek out information regarding how to be actively 
engaged in these behaviors (Augemberg 2008; Schwartz et al. 2014; Verplanken and Holland 
2002; Funk 2002), because doing so provides them the necessary means to participate 
effectively. I therefore expect that people who prioritize self-transcendence values will be 
more psychologically engaged with politics. 
Limited existing empirical evidence points to the nature of relationships between self-
enhancement, openness to change, and conservation values and psychological engagement, 
and the evidence that does exist suggests mostly null relationships between these values and 
psychological engagement (Augemberg 2008). I expect that self-interest will decrease 
psychological engagement with politics because they are less likely to be concerned with 
macro-level societal issues. Though openness to change values also primarily regulate 
personal concerns, if people who value openness to change see certain political actions as 
opportunities for new and exciting experiences then openness to change is likely to increase 
psychological engagement. Like self-transcendence, conservation values tend to regulate 
considerations regarding societal issues (Schwartz 2010). However, if people oriented toward 
conservation believe that political action involves questioning authority or other subversive 
behavior, then conservation values may decrease psychological engagement with politics. 
This is consistent with my expectations regarding how conservation values will decrease 
most forms of political evaluated. An overview of hypotheses regarding indirect effects of 
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values on participation mediated through psychological engagement with politics is shown in 
Table 2. 
  
Though mediation analysis offers the opportunity to explore the psychological 
mechanisms by which values influence political participation, doing so presents a number of 
statistical concerns that should be considered when evaluating mediation effects. First, 
observational data cannot provide statistical evidence of the direction of causal effects. 
However, previous studies have concluded that “the causal influence of basic values on 
political activism is substantially stronger than the reverse effect [because] values are 
fundamental, abstract, motivational principles whereas political activism refers to specific 
behaviors that may express these motivations in particular contexts” (Vecchione et al. 2015: 
7). Even if basic values are antecedent to both psychological engagement with politics and 
political behavior, estimation of mediated effects may be subject to omitted variable bias, and 
thus biased results. If any measure of psychological engagement is correlated not just with 
values but also with other variables that explain political behavior, then the estimated effects 
of psychological engagement and values on participation could be biased (Green, Ha, and 
Bullock 2010; Bullock, Green, and Ha 2010; Mackinnon et al. 2002). However, I believe that 
inclusion of mediation results provides useful information regarding how values influence 
political behavior. In addition, I performed post-hoc evaluation of direct and mediated effects 
by estimating regression models for all political behaviors that exclude any mediator 
Table 1.1: Hypotheses of Direct E↵ects of Values on Participation
Vote Volunteer Contact Pol Demonstrate Donate Pol Org
Self-Transcendence + + + + + +
Self-Enhancement none none none none none none
Openness to Change none + + + none +
Conservation + - - - - -
Table 1.2: Hypotheses of Indirect E↵ects of Values on Participation
Political Interest Political Attention
Self-Transcendence + +
Self-Enhancement - -
Openness to Change + +
Conservation none none
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Political Behaviors Measured
Rate of Behavior Standard Deviation
Vote 84.5% 36.2%
Volunteer 5.0% 21.7%
Contact Politician 17.7% 38.1%
Demonstration 4.1% 19.8%
Donate 12.1% 32.6%
Political Organization 3.8% 19.1%
At Least Two Actions 27.3% 44.5%
All Six Actions 0.6% 7.8%
Average Number of Actions 1.31 1.03
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variables. Results, which can be found in the appendix, are consistent with those found via 
the mediation models presented below.  
Data and Methods 
Procedure and Measures 
The Measuring Morality Survey (MMS) is a representative sample of the United 
States adult population aged 18 and over (N=1519). The survey was fielded in March 2012 
by Knowledge Networks/GfK. The MMS surveyed Americans from all fifty states, asking a 
range of questions regarding their moral beliefs and social and political behaviors. The 
survey took respondents a median time of 42 minutes, and in total 61% of those sampled 
completed the survey. Observations were excluded from analysis for incomplete cases, 
leading to models with sample sizes that vary from N=1,271 to N=1,445. 
In order to analyze both direct and mediated effects of values on political behavior, I 
specify a series of mediation models using ordinary least squares (OLS). Although outcome 
variables are binary, use of OLS allows for simple interpretation of linear probability models. 
Similarly specified logistic regression models are presented in the appendix, and show results 
consistent with those presented in Table 5. In an attempt to confront possible bias associated 
with multicollinearity, I first calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all covariates in 
each regression model, using the vif function from the package “car” in R. In no instance was 
any VIF above 1.87, which is within acceptable VIFs (O’Brien 2007). This evaluates the 
correlation between multiple independent variables and determines whether that correlation 
significantly biases coefficients, with results indicating they did not.2  
																																								 																				
2 In an effort to be extra-cautious, I also estimated OLS models that excluded all political variables, because my 
primary concern with multicollinearity between those variables and values. which are shown in the appendix. 
Estimates from those models, which can be seen in the appendix, very closely align with the mediation models 
presented below. 
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Political Participation. Respondents were asked about their political activity, 
including whether they had voted in the most recent election and whether they had 
participated in a range of political activities in the previous twelve months. For analysis, I 
used the following participation measures: participated in a political demonstration, 
volunteered for a political campaign or candidate, contacted one of their political 
representatives, donated to a political cause, and been active with a political organization. 
Self-reported participation rates for these six behaviors are provided in Table 3.  
 
Eighty-four percent of respondents reported voting in the 2008 presidential election, 
which was by far the most common political action. Although this is significantly higher than 
the 64% of eligible adults who voted in the election, it is actually lower than voter turnout 
rates among registered voters in the same election, which was estimated to be 90% (File and 
Crissey 2010).3 Oher than voting, people reported most frequently contacting an elected 
official (18% of respondents) and donating to a political cause (10% of respondents). All 
other political behaviors were performed by fewer than 10% of respondents. The least 
common actions were membership in a political organization and attendance at a political 
																																								 																				
3 Though the high voter turnout and use of non-validated voter turnout numbers is not preferable, this was the 
only data available from the Measuring Morality Survey.  
Table 1.1: Hypotheses of Direct E↵ects of Values on Participation
Vote Volunteer Contact Pol Demonstrate Donate Pol Org
Self-Transcendence + + + + + +
Self-Enhancement none none none none none none
Openness to Change none + + + none +
Conservation + - - - - -
Table 1.2: Hypotheses of Indirect E↵ects of Values on Participation
Political Interest Political Attention
Self-Transcendence + +
Self-Enhance ent - -
Openness to Change + +
Conservati n none none
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Political Behaviors Measured
Rate of Behavior Standard Deviation
Vote 84.5% 36.2%
Volunteer 5.0% 21.7%
Contact Politician 17.7% 38.1%
Demonstration 4.1% 19.8%
Donate 12.1% 32.6%
Political Organization 3.8% 19.1%
At Least Two Actions 27.3% 44.5%
All Six Actions 0.6% 7.8%
Average Number of Actions 1.31 1.03
   24 
demonstration; approximately 4% of respondents indicated they had performed each within 
the previous year. Approximately 27% of respondents performed at least two different 
political actions, while only 0.6% of the sample performed all five political behaviors in the 
previous year. I also combined all political actions, and found that the average number of 
actions in the sample was 1.31. This summing approach is commonly used to measure the 
effects of various factors on political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Han 
2009) and provides a baseline measure of the effects of values on political participation 
generally. 
Individual Values. Individuals’ values are measured in the MMS via the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz 2003; Schwartz, Lehman and Roccas 1999), an 
abbreviated version of the full Schwartz Value Survey. The PVQ is recommended for 
measuring values on phone and internet surveys because of its clarity and brevity. It consists 
of a battery of twenty-one portraits of people and asks respondents to mark “how much each 
person is or is not like you” on a scale from 1 (“Not at all like me”) to 5 (“Very much like 
me”).4 Descriptive statistics for individual value dimensions are shown in Table 3. 
Covariates. Many variables other than values explain political behavior. Table 4 
presents descriptive statistics for covariates used in analysis. This includes two measures of 
psychological engagement with politics, political interest and political attention. Political 
interest was measured using a four-point scale that asked participants, “In general, how 
interested are you in politics and public affairs?” and scaled to between 0 and 1. Political 
																																								 																				
4 The full Schwartz Value Survey measures ten separate values. These values are shown in a Figure 1 of the 
appendix. In previous studies using the PVQ, the internal reliability of each of the ten lower-order values is 
fairly low, which has led Schwartz (2012) to recommend combining adjacent values into the four value 
orientations I have described in detail throughout this paper. Note that while combining lower-order values into 
the four value dimensions used in analysis is helpful for increasing construct validity, it is also useful because of 
the clarify of these four constructs. They also represent major distinctions in motivations for participating in 
politics. 
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attention was measured by summing frequency of receiving political news via radio, internet, 
print newspaper, television, magazines, and internet blogs. Responses varied from “every 
day” (1) to “never” (6), and were combined and rescaled to a measure from 0 to 1. Two other 
political variables, strength of party identity and strength of political ideology, were also 
included in analysis as control variables. Both were measured using a folded seven-point 
Likert scale, and both were subsequently transformed into variables between 0 (weaker 
political ideology) and 1 (stronger political ideology).  
Age, gender, race, education, and income were all included in analysis. Age is 
continuous and included participants ranging from 18 to 93 years. Gender is binary, either 
male (1) or female (0). Education was measured on a 4-point scale from “Less than high 
school” (1) to “Bachelor’s degree or higher” (4). Annual household income is measured on 
an ordinal scale from “Less than $5,000” (1) to “$175,000 or more” (19). Race was 
transformed into a binary variable for non-white (1) or white (0). 
 
Results 
Analysis begins by ordinary least squares (OLS) mediation models for each of the six 
political actions being evaluated, which allows estimation of how relationship between value 
Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics for Values and Covariates
Mean Standard Error Min-Max Cronbach’s ↵
Individual Values
Self-Transcendence 0.78 0.14 0 - 1 .70
Self-Enhancement 0.56 0.18 0 - 1 .78
Openness to Change 0.64 0.15 0 - 1 .74
Conservation 0.70 0.15 0 - 1 .76
Psychological Engagement
Political Interest 0.67 0.26 0 - 1 -
Political Attention 0.49 0.19 0 - 1 -
Political Controls
Party Identification Strength 0.67 0.30 0 - 1 -
Political Ideology Strength 0.42 0.26 0 - 1 -
Social and Demographic Controls
Education Some College - Less than High School - B.A. or Higher -
Household Income $50-60k - $0 - 175k+ -
Age 50.19 16.72 18 - 93 -
Race, Nonwhite 28% - 0 - 1 -
Gender: Male 49.5% - 0 - 1 -
Note: All variables other than age have been scaled to between zero and one.
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orientations and participation differs across behaviors, as well as how the effects of values on 
each behavior is mediated by psychological engagement. Table 5 shows the results of these 
six models.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE            
Though effects of resource and socio-economic variables are not shown, the effects of 
those values are consistent with past models of political participation in terms of how 
resources and socio-economic status influence participation. More educated people were also 
more likely to engage in most behaviors, including voter turnout, participation in 
demonstrations, contacting elected officials, and donating to political organizations, while 
income and age both increased voter turnout and donations to political organizations (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1995; Dalton 2008a, 2008b). 
Older people were also more likely to vote, volunteer on campaigns, and donate to political 
organizations (Dalton 2008b). Partisanship also increased voter turnout (e.g. Powell 1986; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), though partisanship and strength of political ideology 
had mostly null effects on non-voting participation. Full results of each model, including 
demographics, can be seen in the appendix. 
Direct Effects of Values on Participation 
Self-Transcendence. Self-transcendence values have significant direct, positive 
effects on contacting elected officials, participating in political demonstrations, donating to 
political causes, and participation with political organizations. These results mostly support 
expectations that self-transcendence values increase all forms of participation other than 
voting. The influence of self-transcendence values on participation varies significantly by 
behavior. Self-transcendence has the largest direct and overall effects on contacting elected 
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officials and donating to political organizations, and smaller though still positive 
relationships with attendance at demonstrations and membership in political organizations. 
The linear probability models (LPMs) reported in Table 5 show, for example, that an increase 
over the entire length of the self-transcendence value scale is associated with a 33% increase 
in the likelihood that a person donated to a political organization in the previous year, and a 
31% increase in the probability a person contacted an elected official. Self-transcendence did 
not have a significant effect on voter turnout. One plausible reason is that voting is the least 
personally costly of the political actions analyzed and therefore requires less external 
motivation. An alternative explanation is that voting is not be perceived to be as important 
for helping people as other political actions are. Self-transcendence values also did not have 
any direct effect on campaign volunteering. The reasons for this null relationship are unclear 
and should be evaluated further in future research. 
Overall, self-transcendence increased the likelihood that respondents engaged in four 
of the six political behaviors evaluated. Results provide strong support for the argument that 
a primary motivation of political action is the opportunity to help others. The contrast 
between electoral political action (both voting and volunteering) and non-electoral action 
based on pro-social motivations is interesting and important, particularly in light of previous 
research that shows that concern for others leads to increased voter turnout (e.g. Fowler 
2006; Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989).  
Self-Enhancement. Conflicting theoretical and empirical arguments for how self-
enhancement might influence participation led to establishment of no clearly defined 
expectations regarding the relationship between self-enhancement and each political action 
evaluated. Results suggests that focus on personal well-being does not have meaningful 
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impacts on the likelihood that people engage in most types of political action participating in 
politics. Self-enhancement values also did not influence psychological engagement with 
politics.  
Self-enhancement did have a positive and significant effect on volunteering behavior, 
which suggests that in certain cases political actions may provide opportunities for self-
interested outcomes. Though this single case of self-enhancement increasing participation 
should be approached with some skepticism, the result suggests that people may participate 
in specific ways if they believe that doing so is likely to provide them private benefits, 
whether those are social or material. For example, volunteering can be done with friends and 
offer reputational benefits; alternatively, it could provide an “in” with a campaign in hopes of 
future work or other benefits. However, additional analyses are needed to evaluate when 
people pursue private goods through political action, and whether people who value self-
enhancement are more likely to do so than others who do not prioritize self-enhancement. 
Openness to Change. Contrary to expectations, openness to change has no 
significant direct or indirect effects on any political action. I anticipated that people oriented 
toward openness to change would be more likely to engage in political actions that they 
perceived to be exciting such as attending demonstrations, volunteering, and being a member 
of a political organization as exciting; and that people who valued openness to change would 
be no more or less likely to engage in less exciting political actions. Instead, openness to 
change has no relationship with political behavior at all. The result could be interpreted as 
indicating that people do not perceive political actions as exciting, though this contradicts 
existing research that shows people inclined to pursue new and exciting experiences or who 
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are willing to accept risk in order to do so are more inclined to engage in political actions 
because they offer new, exciting opportunities (Kam 2012; Schwartz 2007).  
Conservation. People who prioritize conservation were more likely to vote than 
others, which aligned with expectations based on the argument that conservation values are 
associated with strong social norms toward dutiful citizenship. I anticipated that conservation 
would also decrease participation in political demonstrations and membership in political 
groups, though instead people who value conservation were less likely to engage in every 
political behavior analyzed other than voting. While I do not have measures of perceived 
potential social disruption associated with each of these behaviors, the result suggests the 
range of political behaviors perceived as a threat to the status quo broader than anticipated. 
These results provide further distinction between voting and other political actions. While 
concerns over tradition and conformity increased the likelihood of voting in the previous 
election, the same values decreased all other forms of behavior.  
Mediated Effects of Values on Participation 
To explore the mediated effects of values on participation further, I specified two 
additional OLS regressions, which estimate relationships between values and psychological 
engagement. Results are shown in Table 6. 
   30 
   
Political interest and attention both mediate the relationship between self-
transcendence and political participation. Overall, results suggest concern for others plays an 
important role in explaining political participation, both through direct effects on individuals’ 
motivations for participating and through increasing interest in and attention to politics. 
Other results regarding relationships between values and psychological engagement, 
however, are not supported. I anticipated that self-enhancement values would decrease 
psychological engagement and that openness to change would increase it. Neither is 
supported in analysis. Regarding openness to change, I anticipated that people would 
interpret certain political actions as exciting, and would be more interested in politics as a 
result. However, given the overwhelmingly null direct results of openness to change on 
participation shown in Table 5, null mediated results are not surprising. The anticipated 
negative effects of self-enhancement on psychological engagement were grounded in the 
belief that the micro-level concerns turn people away from politics. However, both self-
enhancement and openness to change, which predominantly regulate micro-level (i.e. 
Table 1.6: E↵ects of Values on Psychological Engagement Measures
Political Interest Political Attention
(1) (2)
Self Transcendence 0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.07) (0.05)
Self Enhancement  0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.04)
Conservation  0.16⇤⇤  0.08
(0.06) (0.04)
Openness to Change 0.04 0.03
(0.06) (0.05)
Observations 1,348 1,296
Note: Estimates are based on OLS. They do not correspond
directly to e↵ects on each specific political behavior.
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 1.7: E↵ects of Universalism and Benevolence on Political Participation
Vote Volunteer Contact Pol Demonstrate Donate Pol Org
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Direct E↵ects
Universalism  0.01 0.02  0.04 0.04 0.10 0.01
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Benevolence 0.04 0.02 0.20⇤⇤ 0.08⇤ 0.11 0.11⇤⇤
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
To al E↵ects, Direct and Mediated
Universalism 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07⇤ 0.17⇤⇤ 0.05
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Benevolence 0.01 0.02 0.20⇤⇤ 0.07 0.10 0.10⇤
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Models estimated using the Lavaan package in R. Though not presented above, ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
covariates are identical to those presented in Table 5, including other value priorities.
   31 
personal) concerns, simply have no impact on psychological engagement. Results also show 
that conservation values decrease political interest, which leads to a significant negative 
mediated effect of conservation on attendance at demonstrations, contacting elected officials, 
and membership in political organizations. 
Distinguishing Universalism from Benevolence 
By evaluating benevolence and universalism separately, I am able to compare how 
different types of concern for others influence political behaviors. To compare how each of 
universalism and benevolence influence political participation, I proceed in a similar manner 
to the analysis presented above. I estimate models for each political behavior identically to 
those in Table 5, though now I separate self-transcendence into two separate values. Results 
are shown in Table 7.  
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Universalism has no significant direct effects on political participation, while 
benevolence directly increases the likelihood that people contact elected officials, attend 
demonstrations, and are involved with political organizations. These results are contrary to 
expectations that universalism would be the primary driver of the relationship between self-
transcendence and political participation. However, universalism influences participation via 
its relationship to political interest and attention, while benevolence has no impact on 
behaviors mediated through psychological engagement with politics. When considering both 
direct and mediated effects on participation, universalism increases the likelihood that people 
attend demonstrations and donate to political organizations.  
General Discussion 
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The primary purpose of this study was to analyze the influence that values have on 
different types of political action in order to improve our understanding of the relationships 
between different political behaviors and the motivations expressed by individual values. 
Existing work on the subject takes a fairly narrow view of both which values are potentially 
important predictors of political action, and what constitutes political action. This research 
broadens analysis of the relationships between values and participation on both fronts. By 
using a well-established measure of individuals’ values to evaluate a broad range of political 
behaviors, the present research also offers a more robust examination of how concern for 
others influences political participation than past studies. Results provide strong support for 
the presence of important relationships between individuals’ values and their political 
behaviors, suggesting that participation in different behaviors reflect opportunities to pursue 
different personal and social goals.  
This study also evaluates the relationship between different types of concern for 
others and political action in new ways. While the distinction between concern for people 
generally and concern for members of an in-group has been explored in depth elsewhere 
(Fowler and Kam 2007), my results provide new information regarding how different self-
transcendent values impact a wide range of political behaviors. In contrast to past research, I 
find that primary concern for members of one’s in-group does more to explain contacting 
elected officials and membership in political organizations. Meanwhile, universalism only 
influences participation indirectly, through increasing political interest and attention. These 
differences suggest that benevolence and universalism each help explain different types of 
political participation. Helping members of one’s in-group offers a clear end in itself by 
offering the chance to help people that one knows or identifies with closely. Universalism is 
   33 
associated with greater general concern for social issues, which leads those people to be more 
interested in and attentive to politics. 
Results from this research provide new evidence that voting and other political 
behaviors are motivated by different considerations, and are performed by different people. 
While people who valued conformity and tradition were significantly more likely to vote, the 
same people were significantly less likely to engage in all of the five other political behaviors 
analyzed. And people who are concerned by others’ well-being were more likely to perform 
four of the six behaviors analyzed, but were no more likely to vote. These distinctions mirror 
those made regarding how different political actions are influenced by different citizenship 
norms, in particular between engaged citizenship and dutiful citizenship (Dalton 2008a, 
2008b). Engaged citizenship norms typically lead to direct political involvement with actions 
that require high personal costs but which also provide greater instrumental benefits for 
others in addition to expressive opportunities for political actors themselves (Newman and 
Bartels 2010; Dalton 2008a, 2008b). Basic values guide formation of political norms 
(Schwartz 1977, 2010), and results from this study indicate that self-transcendent values may 
help explain formation of engaged citizenship norms in particular. Dutiful citizenship norms, 
on the other hand, typically lead to increased political participation through voting, but may 
actually lead to decreased participation in other, less socially normative ways. Conservation 
values appear to help explain formation of dutiful citizenship norms.  
Though results are consistent with work on different citizenship norms, the sharp 
distinction between motivations to vote and to engage in other political behaviors goes well 
beyond previous research that shows primary differences between voting and other 
participation based on the comparatively low effort, interest, or knowledge required to vote. 
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My results suggest that why people vote is fundamentally different from why they participate 
in other ways. The results also suggest several potential interventions to increase political 
participation. First, campaigns can attempt to highlight how political participation helps 
people. Since people who value self-transcendence are more likely to engage in political 
behavior, connecting participation with political actions would seem to further strengthen 
that relationship. An alternative method is to change which behaviors are perceived to be 
normative. This study suggests that people vote because they believe doing so is their 
responsibility as a conforming member of a democratic society, conservation actually 
decreasing engagement in other ways. On possibility for addressing this is to change which 
behaviors are perceived as normative: if people determine it is their responsibility as citizens 
to engage in all types of actions, then they will be more likely to do so. 
Future work could deepen our understanding of several aspects of the relationship 
between values and participation. First, future work should also why they perform specific 
political behaviors, rather than just evaluating the relationship between individuals’ value 
orientations and their behaviors. Doing so is important for determining whether the 
relationships identified in this research reflect conscious decisions to participate in ways that 
align with individuals’ values, or whether they reflect subconscious participatory choices. 
Second, research to evaluate when and why specific values are activated is necessary to 
better understand the mechanisms by which values influence political decision-making. In 
addition, future research should also explore whether and how values can be used by 
campaigns to motivate specific types of behaviors when they are needed. For example, 
although people who value conservation are more likely to vote, it is unknown whether 
messages that highlight tradition frames will be most effective for increasing turnout. 
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Because values are held by everyone, they have the potential to be a broadly used and 
effective tool if researchers can demonstrate how to use those values to increase participation 
in specific ways.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1.5: Direct and Mediated E↵ects of Values on Political Participation
(Direct E↵ect) (Indirect E↵ect) (Total E↵ect)
DV: Voter Turnout (N=1,271)
Self Transcendence 0.04 0.06⇤ 0.09
(0.09) (0.02) (0.09)
Self Enhancement  0.001 0.01  0.09
(0.07) (0.02) (0.07)
Conservation 0.20⇤⇤  0.04⇤ 0.16⇤
(0.08) (0.02) (0.08)
Openness to Change  0.10 0.02  0.08
(0.09) (0.02) (0.09)
DV: Campaign Volunteering (N=1,271)
Self Transcendence 0.05 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.09
(0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Self Enhancement 0.13⇤⇤ 0.001 0.13⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Conservation  0.15⇤⇤  0.03⇤⇤  0.17⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Openness to Change 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.09) (0.01) (0.05)
DV: Attend Demonstration (N=1,271)
Self Transcendence 0.14⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Self Enhancement  0.01 0.001  0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Conservation  0.11⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.13⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Openness to Change 0.02 0.004 0.02
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
DV: Contact Elected O cial (N=1,271)
Self Transcendence 0.20⇤ 0.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.03) (0.10)
Self Enhancement 0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.04) (0.02) (0.08)
Conservation  0.20⇤  0.07⇤⇤  0.28⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.02) (0.09)
Openness to Change 0.07 0.02 0.10
(0.09) (0.03) (0.10)
DV: Pol Org Donation (N=1,271)
Self Transcendence 0.26⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.33⇤⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.02) (0.08)
Self Enhancement  0.08 0.002  0.08
(0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Conservation  0.25⇤⇤⇤  0.04⇤⇤  0.29⇤⇤⇤
(0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
Openness to Change 0.04 0.01 0.05
(0.08) (0.01) (0.08)
DV: Pol Org Membership (N=1,273)
Self Transcendence 0.13⇤ 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Self Enhancement  0.03 0.001  0.02
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Conservation  0.11⇤  0.03⇤⇤  0.14⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Openness to Change  0.02 0.01  0.02
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Note: Models estimated using the Lavaan package in R.
Estimated as linear probability models (LPMs). Each model includes political interest and
attention as mediators, and partisan strength, ideological strength, education, income,
age, gender, and race as control variables. The full model and a separate logistic
model are both shown in the appendix.
⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
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Abstract 
 Solving global environmental problems like climate change will require individuals to 
engage in many types of collective action. Whereas existing literature suggests three 
categories of environmental behavior – private activism, public activism, and environmental 
policy support – an analysis of a California statewide survey (N=1077) showed the presence 
of as many as six distinct types of common environmental behaviors. Analysis indicated that 
environmental political activism was not strongly motivated by values, while self-
transcendent values had large impacts on willingness to engage in non-activist environmental 
behaviors like purchasing environmental products, household conservation behavior, 
environmental policy support, and communicating policy opinions to peers and 
policymakers. Environmental consumer behaviors were also higher among people who 
prioritized self-enhancement values, suggesting that purchasing decisions may be uniquely 
motivated by perceived individual benefits, unlike other environmental behaviors. However, 
value-framed messages that focus on these different values do not appear to inspire 
environmental behaviors in line with these distinctions, as revealed by a survey experiment 
(N=456). 
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1. Introduction 
 How and why people engage in environmental behaviors is a fundamental question of 
environmental social science research. However, the character of environmental behaviors, in 
particular the distinct ways people pursue pro-environmental outcomes and how those 
choices are impacted by different personal motivations, remains understudied and poorly 
understood. Major environmental problems like climate change necessitate individual 
participation in several important ways. As consumers and private actors, individuals must 
change daily routines to minimize their carbon footprints and otherwise reduce 
environmental impacts, and as citizens they must push policymakers to produce 
environmental policies that help solve these major problems (Hale 2008; Thogersen and 
Crompton 2009; Kashima, Paladino, and Margetts 2014; Tobler et al. 2012; Stern 2000). 
 Though a theoretically defensible typological of environmental behavior was 
proposed nearly two decades ago (Stern 2000), nearly all environmental behavior studies 
either discount or entirely neglect theoretical and statistical distinctions between types of 
behaviors. As with political participation generally, the nature of how individuals engage on 
environmental issues has and continues to evolve. While environmental activism of the past 
may have primarily involved membership in environmental advocacy organizations like the 
Sierra Club or supporting certain environmental policies through contacting elected officials, 
the accessibility of other types of environmental activism has increased dramatically through 
increased awareness of the environmental consequences of consumer and other everyday 
decisions (Norris 2002; Copeland 2014), among other means. Even so, environmental 
behavior research has focused efforts on identifying explanations for either specific 
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environmental behaviors, or environmental behavior generally. These studies do not consider 
whether different environmental behaviors organize into meaningful types. As a result, 
although a large literature examines how causal factors like values and attitudes influence 
individuals’ intentions to perform environmental behaviors, results from those studies are 
unable to predict how these factors influence different types of environmental behaviors.  
 This study uses a novel observational survey (N=1077) to examine the character of 
environmental behavior, including how behaviors organize based on latent factors, how 
individuals’ engagement with certain types of environmental behaviors corresponds to 
engagement with other environmental behaviors, and how motivations – in particular, those 
expressed by individuals’ values – differ across types of environmental behavior. I find that 
environmental behaviors differentiate into more types of behavior than past research suggests 
– from fifteen behavior measures, six categories emerge: household behavior, consumer 
behavior, political communications, engagement with environmental groups, participation in 
demonstrations, and support for pro-environmental policies. I then evaluate how motivations 
differ across these behaviors, and show that self-transcendent values have the largest 
influence on non-activist environmental behaviors like consumption choices, household 
behaviors, policy support, and expressing policy opinions to peers and policymakers, while 
environmental political activism was not strongly motivated by self-transcendent values. 
Environmental consumer behaviors were also higher among egoists – people concerned with 
their own well-being – suggesting that purchasing decisions may be uniquely motivated by 
perceived personal benefits, as compared to other environmental behaviors. I apply these 
findings to a framing experiment (N=456) to test whether value-framed messages can be 
used as an intervention to motivate specific environmental behaviors. Though estimates are 
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imprecise and do not reach statistical significance, they suggest that altruistic and egoistic 
messages are more effective than biospheric messages across most types of environmental 
behavior. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. A Typology of Environmental Behavior 
 Though people may feel powerless to address major environmental problems, the 
opportunities to influence environmental outcomes are extremely diverse. The expansive and 
imprecise way that most research discusses “environmental behavior” betrays the fact that 
different types of environmental behavior are both theoretically and statistically distinct. 
Stern (2000: 410) developed a conceptual framework for understanding environmental 
behaviors that proposed three distinct types of behavior: environmental activism, including 
involvement with environmental organizations and participation in demonstrations; non-
activist public sphere behaviors, which include tacit support for pro-environmental policies 
and active (but not activist) public environmental behaviors like signing petitions or making 
financial contributing to environmental organizations; and private-sphere environmental 
actions, which include activities like purchasing green products, managing energy usage, and 
recycling.  
 The defining characteristic of private behaviors as categorized by Stern (2000) is that 
they allow actors to directly impact environmental outcomes, rather than relying on 
government regulation. Private environmental behaviors are the most commonly performed 
type of environmental behavior, and are also often cited as the most effective way for 
individuals to protect the environment (Farrer, 2016; Gerring and Thacker, 2008). Changing 
private environmental behaviors is essential to addressing major environmental problems 
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because individuals’ economic activity is a primary driver of environmental degradation 
(Stern 1999). Like political consumerism generally, private-sphere environmental actions 
allow citizens to be engaged on issues that otherwise feel distant or complex or for which 
government is unresponsive to their demands (Newman and Bartels, 2010; Stolle and 
Hooghe 2004; Bennett 2004). The federal government has done very little to address climate 
change, for example; concerned citizens can thus turn to their own actions as means of 
addressing the problem instead. Government intervention can have significant impacts on 
both attitudes toward and adoption of private environmental behaviors – for example, better 
recycling infrastructure has been shown to increase the perceived effectiveness and 
likelihood of engaging in recycling behavior (Wan, Shen, and Yu 2014). However, it seems 
less likely that this works both ways – an important defining characteristic of private 
environmental behaviors, as compared to public actions, is that they are performed without 
the intent of changing public policy.  
 Though distinguishing between public and private environmental behaviors is both 
useful for crafting campaigns and public policies and understanding how and why people 
attempt to protect the environment, it is also important to evaluate whether different types of 
private behaviors are distinguishable from one another in important ways. Environmental 
consumer action requires knowledge of the social and political implications of specific 
products, and consumers typically pay more for environmentally friendly products than they 
would for equivalent conventional ones (Newman and Bartels 2010). As a result, consumer 
actions require either high levels of commitment to environmental issues, or access to 
resources that make purchasing higher-cost products relatively easy (Gardner and Stern 
1996; Stern 2000). Other private environmental actions like recycling and home energy 
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conservation may be more likely motivated by habit, local ordinance, or market signals (e.g. 
demand response to electricity pricing). 
 Environmental political activism attempts to force government policy change. The 
inherent collectivism of environmental political activism (Lee et al. 2014) means it is the 
most likely type of environmental behavior to suffer from insufficient public engagement as 
a result of a free-rider problem (Olson, 2009 [1965]). Environmental political activism may 
also be perceived by potential actors as a “more committed and riskier form of activism” 
(Stern 2000: 88; Kashima, Paladino, and Margetts 2014; Stern 1999). Most citizens do not 
regularly attend environmental group meetings, join protests, or engage in other types of 
environmental political activism, and those who do are likely to feel highly invested in the 
political process (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995). 
The motivational measures used to explain other environmental behaviors, such as values 
and attitudes, often only explain small variation in activist behaviors, which is indicative of 
the greater contextual and effort-based constraints of public activist behaviors. This is a 
primary reason research on environmental activism focuses on how organizations recruit and 
develop activists (e.g. Andrews et al. 2010). As with private environmental behavior, 
however, environmental political activism may be distinguishable in important ways. 
 Government also responds to the public’s environmental priorities as expressed in 
less forceful ways. Stern (2000) calls these non-activist environmental behaviors. Surveys of 
citizens’ policy positions are widely distributed by the media and used by policymakers to 
justify action or non-action on environmental policy proposals (Krosnick, Visser, and Harder 
2010). The public makes its opinions known through contacting politicians, signing petitions 
or sharing opinions with other citizens. These non-activist political behaviors offer “one of 
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the most important resources for the environmental movement,” because they provide cover 
for activists and elected officials looking to change policy (Stern et al. 1999: 81; Dietz and 
Guagnano 1998; Skocpol 2013). Support for the goals of the environmental movement may 
also be a first step toward more personally effortful behaviors (Klandermans and Oegema 
1987; Hunt et al. 1994; Stern et al. 1999). While the intention of both environmental political 
activist and non-activist behaviors are often the same, non-activist behaviors typically require 
significantly less commitment. Though political scientists typically consider policy opinions 
as more reflective of attitudes than behavioral intentions, they nonetheless represent an 
important element of attempts to protect the environment. As a result, I choose to test 
whether policy opinions represent a distinct “behavior” alongside environmental 
communication behaviors like contacting elected officials or sharing opinions on social 
media, as well as the public and private activist behaviors described above. 
 To my knowledge, only four studies evaluate the fidelity of the a three-factor 
behavioral framework presented by Stern (2000). The most recent study (Lee et al. 2014) 
finds three behavioral factors among thirteen measures: environmental consumer behavior, 
environmental activist behavior, and “citizenship” behavior, which involves private actions 
like recycling, reducing use of aerosol cans, keeping their local environment clean, and 
voting for environmental candidates. A second study (Whitmarsh and O’Neill 2010) 
identifies eight factors from twenty-six behavioral questions, including only two questions 
about environmental political action and twenty-four private-sphere behaviors, which loaded 
onto seven separate factors such as eco-shopping, waste reduction, domestic energy 
consumption, and several others. The two other studies identify factors for environmental 
consumerism, environmental political behaviors, and support for environmental policies or 
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willingness to sacrifice for environmental quality (Dietz, Stern, and Guagnano 1998; Stern et 
al. 1999). My study goes further than these by measuring multiple behaviors across all three 
types of behaviors outlined by Stern (2000). In addition, I evaluate the motivational 
distinctions across these types of behaviors, as expressed by values and described in detail in 
the next section. 
2.2. Motivational Influences on Environmental Behaviors 
 Distinguishing types of environmental behaviors in meaningful ways requires not 
only identifying statistical differences through modeling linear combinations of individual 
actions to determine whether they are explained by latent variables. Understanding 
differences across behaviors also requires knowledge of why people perform different types 
of environmental behavior. A number of individual motivational factors influence 
environmental behavior generally, and can help guide a systematic evaluation of how those 
factors differ across types of behavior. For example, there is evidence of environmental 
behavior “clustering” based on how frequently environmental behaviors are performed, the 
effort or commitment required, or individuals’ lifestyles (Tobler et al. 2012; Whitmarsh and 
O’Neill 2010; Thogersen and Olander 2006; Balderjahn 1988). In addition, relationships 
between individuals’ values, attitudes and environmental behaviors are well-established in 
dozens of published works (Heberlein 1972; Stern and Dietz 1994; Schultz and Zelezny 
1998; Schultz 2001; Bamberg and Moser, 2007; De Groot and Steg 2008; Steg et al. 2014). 
The present research evaluates which behaviors are related to different values and draws 
conclusions based on what is known about how values influence environmental behaviors 
generally.   
2.2.1. Values and Environmental Behavior 
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 Values define what is most important to each of us. They are fundamental to who we 
are and how we think of ourselves (Rokeach 1973; Bardi and Schwartz 2003). Values are 
more abstract than concepts like environmental attitudes or the norms that help govern our 
environmental behaviors (Stern, Dietz, and Kalof 1993). The relationship between 
individuals’ values and environmental behaviors is most clearly presented in the Value-
Belief-Norm (VBN) model of environmental behavior (Stern et al. 1999; Stern 2000). The 
VBN proposes that individuals’ values help guide their ecological worldview, which in turn 
influences the perceived consequences of actions and ability to influence outcomes. 
 In the previous chapter, I evaluated the effects of four different value orientations – 
self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness to change, and conservation – on general 
political behaviors. Research evaluating the relationships between values and environmental 
behaviors has focused primarily on how self-transcendence and self-enhancement values 
explain behaviors, based on the belief that pro-environmental behavior is primarily motivated 
by either self-interested or pro-social considerations (Stern, Dietz, and Kalof 1993). Previous 
literature has evaluated the effects of conservation and openness to change values on 
environmental attitudes and behaviors (Stern et al. 1999), but typically does not find 
significant relationships between environmental behaviors and those values. Environmental 
psychology research has compellingly shown that environmental behavior can be explained 
by two different self-transcendent value types – altruism (i.e. self-transcendence toward other 
people) and biospherism (i.e. self-transcendence toward non-human others) (Stern, Dietz, and 
Kalof 1993; De Groot and Steg 2008). As a result, environmental behavior research that 
evaluates the relationship between values and environmental behavior most frequently 
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distinguishes three values that are relevant to environmental behaviors: altruism, egoism,5 
and biospherism6 (Stern, Dietz, and Kalof 1993; Stern et al. 1999; De Groot and Steg 2008).  
 Use of these three values is based on extensive research and writing, both empirical 
and philosophical, regarding what types of values influence environmental beliefs and 
behaviors (e.g. Leopold 1949; Hardin 1968; Olson 1965; Heberlein 1972; Heberlein and 
Black 1978; Van Liere 1978; Stern, Dietz, and Kalof 1993; Schultz and Zelezny 1998). 
Environmental psychology research treats environmental behavior as “a special case within a 
social-psychological theory of altruism” in which not only social-altruism, but also 
biospheric-altruism (i.e. biospherism) and egoism may influence environmental behaviors 
(Stern, Dietz, and Kalof 1993: 324). Altruists are motivated to perform environmental 
behaviors that provide the opportunity to help other people, for example by fighting to reduce 
air pollution that causes asthma or mitigating climate change that will impact future 
generations. Egoists are primarily concerned with their own welfare, and will avoid actions 
																																								 																				
5 Altruism and egoism are measured using the same survey questions that are used to measure self-
transcendence and self-enhancement in chapter 1 – both studies utilize questions as part of the Portrait Values 
Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz 2003; Schwartz, Lehman and Roccas 1999). Environmental psychology research 
has primarily referred to altruism and egoism, because in some cases other means of measuring those values are 
utilized. Self-transcendence and self-enhancement come from the vocabulary specifically developed by 
Schwartz (1992, 1994). Biospherism is a measure of altruism that establishes a distinction between social-
altruism, or concern for the well-being of other people, and bio-altruism, or concern for the well-being of other 
non-human entities like animals, plants, and entire ecosystems. This distinction has a long history in 
environmental ethics (e.g. Leopold 1949; Heberlein 1972), and has been the subject of extensive empirical 
analysis. 
 
6 Although biospherism may be interpreted as a domain-specific value and thus not particularly different from 
an environmental attitude, extensive psychological research suggests that biospherism most closely 
approximates fundamental values like self-transcendence and self-enhancement (De Groot and Steg 2008; 
Stern, Dietz, and Kalof 1993; Stern et al. 1999). Biospherism is more abstract than attitudes, influencing how 
individuals interpret and react across situations that might impact the environment. However, the distinction 
between altruism and biospherism has been the subject of extensive analysis and argument, with many existing 
studies showing no distinction between altruism and biospherism (Bardi and Schwartz 2003; McCarty and 
Schrum 1994; Stern and Dietz 1994). The recent consensus is that biospherism and altruism represent distinct 
fundamental values, and as a result I have opted to measure both, perform factor analysis to evaluate whether 
they are statistically distinguishable, and evaluate the relationship between each and different environmental 
behaviors. 
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that present greater personal costs than benefits. Although pro-environmental behaviors often 
involve personal sacrifice to produce shared public benefits, leading egoists to engage in 
fewer pro-environmental behaviors, certain environmental behaviors may be perceived as 
personally beneficial. For example, NIMBY (“not in my back yard!”) issues that influence 
local environmental conditions may be motivated by egoism (Stern, Dietz, and Kalof 1993). 
The reputational or social benefits described in Chapter 1 of this dissertation may also lead 
egoism to motivate environmental behaviors, as is the case with more visible forms of 
behavior that act as signals to others that a person is environmentally conscientious (Brick, 
Sherman, and Kim 2017; Griskevicius, Tybur, and Van den Bergh 2010). Biospherism has 
roots in the “land ethic” (Leopold 1949), which advocates for a system of ethics that values 
nonhuman species and whole ecosystems. Pro-environmental behaviors like protection of 
invasive species or mitigating climate change to protect the earth’s animals and ecosystems 
are motivated by biospherism. 
 Though extensive past research connects individuals’ values to their environmental 
behaviors, that work either evaluates the impacts of values on single behaviors or behaviors 
that are combined in ways that are neither systematic nor statistically validated. For example, 
people who are motivated by pro-social considerations like altruism and biospherism are 
more likely to buy green products, sign environmental petitions, attend environmental rallies, 
donate to environmental organizations, and support numerous pro-environmental policies 
(e.g. Stern and Dietz 1994; Stern, et al. 1999; Stern 1999; Stern 2000; Dietz, Dan, and 
Shwom 2007; Steg, Dreijerink, and Abrahamse 2005). However, no research to my 
knowledge evaluates how each of these values motivate different types of environmental 
behavior. Doing so can help identify which behaviors are perceived to primarily impact 
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people, nature, or both. Egoists, on the other hand, are typically less likely to engage in a 
range of environmental behaviors. However, pro-environmental behaviors are also at times 
motivated by self-interest (Bamberg and Moser 2007; Steg and Vlek 2008; Brick et al. 2017; 
Griskivicius et al. 2010), and egoists will likely be inclined toward behaviors that are 
perceived as offering personal benefits. Evaluating the impacts of egoism on different types 
of environmental behavior can help determine which behaviors are perceived to provide 
personal benefits. Together, these unknowns mean that this analysis provides significant 
opportunities to add to the significant existing research regarding how individuals’ values 
help explain environmental behaviors.  
2.2.3. Other Influences on Environmental Behaviors: Attitudes, Interests, and Ideology 
 Several other individual characteristics may also motivate individuals to engage in 
different environmental behaviors, or influence the relationship between values and those 
behaviors. Environmental orientation, most commonly measured by the New Ecological 
Paradigm (NEP; Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Dunlap et al. 2000), is consistently associated 
with increased environmental behavior (Steg and Vlek 2009; Poortinga, Steg, and Vlek 2004; 
Schultz and Zelezny 1998). Environmental orientation also often mediates the relationship 
between individuals’ values and intentions to engage in pro-environmental behaviors 
(Poortinga, Steg, and Vlek 2004; Stern, Dietz, and Guagnano 1995). Though environmental 
orientation explains many environmental behaviors, some studies suggest that it motivates 
low-cost, non-activist environmental behaviors more than behaviors that require high 
individual effort or personal sacrifice (Poortinga, Steg, and Vlek 2004). Models commonly 
evaluate environmental behaviors by including both values and these measures of 
environmental orientation, along with other covariates (e.g. Bamberg and Moser 2007; Steg 
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and Vlek 2009; Dietz and Shwom 2009). By first categorizing environmental behaviors 
based on their underlying factor structure and then evaluating the effects of environmental 
orientation on those behaviors, this study evaluates how environmental orientation and other 
commonly used variables influence different types of environmental behaviors in ways that 
other studies have not. 
 Individuals’ interest in politics may also influence environmental behaviors. Though 
many environmental behaviors bypass government intervention altogether (e.g. private 
environmental behaviors), consumer behaviors share many of the same participatory norms 
and motivations as other forms of political action (Copeland 2014). As compared to more 
traditional types of political participation, political and environmental consumerism may 
actually require higher levels of interest in politics and knowledge of policy issues (Newman 
and Bartels 2010). Consumer behaviors require actors to understand the environmental 
implications of their economic activity and to pay higher costs in pursuit of specific 
environmental outcomes. In addition, political activism is often motivated by general interest 
in politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
 Political ideology and party identity may also influence decisions regarding whether 
and how to perform environmental behaviors. Environmental protection has become 
increasingly partisan in recent decades (Guber 2012; Krosnick et al. 2006), making the effect 
of individuals’ political loyalties more important to their environmental beliefs and actions. 
Liberals and Democrats tend to be more concerned about the environment, and thus more 
likely to engage in environmental behaviors, while conservatives and Republicans are less 
concerned (Guber 2012; Carlisle and Smith 2007; Dunlap et al. 2000; Bain et al. 2004).7 The 
																																								 																				
7 However, see the discussion in Carlisle and Smith (2007) regarding cases in which ideology only weakly 
explains environmental attitudes. 
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clearest relationship between political ideology and environmental behavior is with non-
activist behaviors like policy support, because of the politicization of environmental policy 
issues (Daniels et al. 2012; Konisky, Milyo, and Richardson 2008; Dietz et al. 2007; Jones 
and Dunlap 1992). Political ideology and party identification may also influence private 
action to reduce personal carbon footprints (Gromet, Kunreuther, and Larrick 2013; 
Leiserowitz 2005), though that relationship is not consistent across most studies. 
3. Study One: Empirically Distinguishing Different Environmental Behaviors 
3.1. Procedure 
 To evaluate the underlying structure of environmental behaviors, and whether 
environmental behavior categories are motivated by different values and other social-
psychological characteristics, I fielded a California-wide survey (N=1077) in April 2017 
using an online panel maintained by Qualtrics. This was part of a large survey experiment 
and used online quota sampling to gather a sample of California residents that was balanced 
by household income and political party affiliation and oversampled rural residents.8 There 
was a significant washout period between treatment and measurement of variables used in 
this analysis; however, to confirm that experimental treatments from the separate study did 
not significantly influence environmental behavior responses, a series of robustness checks 
were performed. After testing twenty different possible treatment effects on different 
environmental behavior measures, a single case of treatment assignment impacting 
environmental behavior was found. As a result, I am confident that treatments did not have 
systematic effects on the variables included in this study.   
																																								 																				
8 The survey experiment is not part of the present study. Oversampling of rural residents was performed as part 
of the separate survey experiment, and residency is controlled for in the present analysis. 
   52 
 After the washout, participants were asked to self-report how frequently they engaged 
in environmental behaviors and how supportive they are of a number of environmental policy 
proposals. They were then asked about their individual values, environmental orientation, 
political interest, political ideology and party identification, and were asked a number of 
demographic questions. Several attention checks were used in the survey. Responses from 
any participant who spent less than 33% or more than 300% of mean survey response time 
were excluded from analysis. In addition, participants were asked two separate control 
questions, each of which required that they click a specific multiple choice option. 
Participants who failed any of the attention check questions were excluded from analysis. 
 Analysis began with a confirmatory factor analysis of Stern’s (2000) three-factor 
framework on the fifteen behaviors measured. As is described in detail below, that 
confirmatory analysis did not yield a good fit, and so exploratory factor analysis was 
subsequently performed. Environmental behavior measures in both surveys involved binary 
and ordinal variables, which led to use of mixed polychoric and tetrachoric correlations for 
factor analysis. I then evaluated the relationship between environmental behavior categories 
through a series of Pearson’s correlations. Finally, separate regression models were specified 
for each type of environmental behavior. Each model estimated the effects of values, 
environmental orientation, political interest, ideology, party identification, and demographic 
characteristics on environmental behaviors. 
3.3. Measures 
 Environmental behaviors. Each respondent answered fifteen environmental 
behavior questions, including five questions regarding their support for environmental policy 
issues and ten questions about their environmental actions. These fifteen were selected based 
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on an evaluation of the most commonly studied and most frequently performed 
environmental behaviors that are deemed environmentally significant across a diverse range 
of behavior types. While private environmental behaviors are surely more common in 
general than public-sphere behaviors, my interest was in evaluating whether different types 
of environmental behaviors were explained by different latent factors, and whether they were 
motivated by different individual values and environmental attitudes. My evaluation of these 
behaviors was also limited by practical considerations, including survey space.   
 Stern et al. (1999) asked participants four questions related to environmental 
consumerism including how often participants buy organic produce, how often they buy 
products made from recycled materials, how often they buy household items that are 
environmentally friendly, and how often they avoid products from companies they believe to 
harm the environment. In the present study, the list of private environmental behaviors that 
measured was condensed to purchase of organic produce, purchase of environmentally 
friendly home products, conservation of home energy, and home recycling. They were 
measured by asking respondents to “Please indicate how often you personally do each of the 
below actions in an effort to protect the environment.” Responses were measured on a Likert 
scale from “Always” (5) to “Never” (1). Though other behaviors like car ownership, air 
travel, and meat consumption also have significant environmental impacts (Stern 2000), 
several of them are less common and may also be more likely to be motivated by other 
considerations (e.g. job requirements, non-environmental food preferences).  
 Environmental political actions were measured by asking respondents, “Over the past 
12 months, have you engaged in any of the following actions to support environmental 
protection?” Response options included signing petitions, calling or writing letters to elected 
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officials, participation in environmental demonstrations, volunteering for an environmental 
group, and donating money to an environmental group. These five measures represent some 
of the most common and well-studied forms of environmental political engagement. Large 
environmental advocacy organizations, which collectively have millions of members in the 
United States, frequently ask members and the general public to engage in all of these ways. 
Stern et al. (1999) asked respondents very similar questions, including whether they were a 
member of an environmental group, had given money to an environmental group in the 
previous year, had signed a petition in support of environmental protection in the previous 
year, had called or written a letter to an elected official in the previous year, and had attended 
an environmental demonstration in the previous year. Stern et al. (1999) also asked 
respondents whether they had read any environmental publications and whether they had 
voted for a candidate in an election because of their environmental positions in the previous 
year, though these questions were excluded from my analysis for brevity. 
 Stern (2000) distinguishes non-activist public environmental behavior into “more 
active kinds of citizenship” (Stern 2000: 409) and environmental policy support. “More 
active” non-activist citizenship behaviors like contacting legislators is captured in the 
measures described in detail above, while policy support is measured by asking respondents 
about their support for five environmental policy issues, including cap-and-trade to address 
carbon emissions, subsidies for renewable energy producers, conservation of sensitive land, 
protections for endangered or threatened species, and regulations to prevent air and water 
pollution. Responses were measured on a Likert scale from “Strongly Support” (5) to 
“Strongly Oppose” (1).  
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 Values. Egoism, altruism, and biospherism were measured using the Portrait Values 
Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, 2003), an abridged version of the Schwartz Value Survey 
(SVS; Schwartz, 1977, 1992) that is better-suited to online surveys than the SVS. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was performed for these values measures and results indicate 
that three distinct factors are present among the nine values questions, with responses 
organized as anticipated.9 Responses were combined into single variables for egoism (three 
items, µ = 3.16, a = .68), altruism (three items, µ = 4.15, a = .77), and biospherism (three 
items, µ = 3.98, a = .80). 
 Environmental Concern. Environmental concern was measured using an abridged 
version of the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP; Dunlap et al. 2000) that includes five 
measures as used previously by Stern (1999). Principal component analysis using a 
polychoric correlation matrix because of the ordinal nature of the variables revealed that the 
five measures were organized into a single component (five items, µ = 3.30, a=.64).10 
Descriptive statistics for both values, environmental orientation, and political ideology and 
interest are all shown in Table 1. 
 
																																								 																				
9 Results from this factor analysis can be seen in the appendix. 
10 Results from this factor analysis are shown in the appendix. 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Cronbach’s ↵
Individual Values
Altruism 1,077 4.15 0.68 1.00 5.00 0.77
Biospherism 1,077 3.98 0.71 1.00 5.00 0.80
Egoism 1,077 3.16 0.88 1.00 5.00 0.68
Attitude Measures
NEP 1,074 3.30 0.86 1.00 5.00 0.64
Ideology 1,013 3.68 1.71 1.00 7.00 -
Political Interest 1,077 3.70 1.07 1.00 5.00 -
Table 2.2: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Environmental Behaviors, Study 1
Env Consumerism Household Env Env Political Comms Env Organizations Env Demonstrations Policy Support
Buy Green Consumer Goods 0.83 0.18 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.02
Buy Organic Produce 0.96 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.10 -0.04
Sort Recycling at Home -0.10 0.86 0.04 0.12 -0.07 0.06
Home Energy Conservation 0.19 0.80 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04
Contact Politician -0.12 0.09 0.71 0.03 0.24 -0.09
Sign Petition -.07 -0.11 0.75 -0.11 -0.04 0.10
Social Media 0.12 -.0.08 0.64 -0.08 0.01 0.01
Volunteer -0.12 0.09 -0.13 0.96 0.23 0.01
Donate 0.19 -0.07 0.19 0.45 -0.39 -0.03
Participate in Demonstration 0.15 -0.09 0.11 0.20 0.87 0.01
Support Pollution Regulation -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.91
Support Renewables Subsidies -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.87
Support Land Conservation 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.90
Support Threatened Species -0.10 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.88
Support Cap and Trade 0.17 -0.12 -0.06 0.03 0.08 0.83
SS Loadings 1.76 1.51 1.51 1.10 1.00 3.89
Prop Variance 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.26
Cum Variance 0.12 0.22 0.32 0.39 0.46 0.72
Cum Prop 0.16 0.30 0.44 0.55 0.64 1.00
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Environmental Behaviors, Study 1
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Env Consumerism 1,073 3.27 0.88 1.00 5.00
Household Env 1,075 4.43 0.63 1.50 5.00
Env Political Comms 1,077 0.55 0.78 0 3
Env Organizations 1,077 0.24 0.48 0 2
Env Demonstrations 1,077 0.03 0.17 0 1
Policy Support 1,077 4.01 0.86 1.00 5.00
1
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 Political Variables. Political ideology was measured on a seven-point Likert scale, 
from “extremely liberal” (1) to “extremely conservative” (7). Party identification was 
measured by asking participants whether they identify as a Democrat, Republican, 
Independent/Unaffiliated, or Other. Political interest is also included in analysis of 
environmental behavior, which is atypical of most environmental behavior studies, but is 
commonly included in general models of political participation. I include political interest 
both as a way of identifying which behaviors require greater individual initiative and to 
determine whether people who are more interested in politics seek out specific types of 
environmental engagement. Political interest was measured on a five-point Likert scale from 
“not at all interested” (1) to “extremely interested” (5). 
 Control Variables. Race, income, gender, education, age, and rural or urban 
residence were all included in regression models. Sample statistics can be seen in the 
appendix. Race was measured as a categorical variable that included options for participants 
to indicate whether they self-identify racially or ethnically as White, Black, Latino, Asian, or 
American Indian. Gender is coded as male (1) or female (0). Age is measured as a continuous 
variable. Income and education both play significant roles in explaining political 
participation because they provide people with access to resources that can be important or 
even requisite for participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Income may be 
particularly important for environmental behaviors that require financial sacrifices like green 
consumer behaviors or donating money to environmental advocacy organizations, while 
education is associated with greater political knowledge and skills, as well as willingness to 
engage on issue-based activism due to more awareness of specific issues (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Campbell et al. 1960; Carmines and Stimson 1980; all via Newman and Bartels 
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2010). Household income was measured on an ordered scale ranging from “Less than 
$20,000” to “Over $150,000.” Education was measured on an ordered scale from “Less than 
high school” to professional and advanced degrees. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Evaluating Different Environmental Behaviors 
 I begin with a factor analysis and descriptive statistics of the fifteen behaviors 
measured. I began by testing whether the three-factor model (Stern et. al 1999; Stern 2000) 
fit my fifteen measures of environmental behavior via a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). 
Because the behavioral measures are all categorical and ordinal and are not all distributed 
normally, the most appropriate estimate of fit to the three-factor model is Weighted Root 
Mean Residual with standardized (WRMR; Yu 2002; Schreiber et al. 2006). Analysis 
revealed poor model fit (WRMR=1.60; acceptable WRMR is <.90). After the poor fit of the 
confirmatory factor analysis was revealed, I estimated an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
to determine whether a different factor structure fit the data sufficiently. The EFA revealed 
six distinct latent factors of environmental behavior.  
 Cumulatively, the six-factor model explained 72% of variance across all six factors, 
while the three-factor model only explained 52%. All five environmental policy support 
measures loaded onto a single factor representing pro-environmental policy support 
(proportion of variance explained = 0.26). The measures of private environmental behavior 
are organized into two factors, environmental consumer behavior (0.11 of variance 
explained) and household environmental behavior (0.10 of variance explained). The 
distinction between consumer and household behaviors is consistent with previous work that 
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finds different factors for environmental purchasing and other private environmental actions 
(Lee et al. 2014; Whitmarsh and O’Neill 2010; Markle 2013). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 Measures of environmental political activism loaded onto three additional factors, 
suggesting the need to distinguish between more than just environmental political activist and 
non-activist behaviors. One factor represents environmental communications behavior (0.10 
of variance explained) – these behaviors attempt to influence policy by publicizing one’s 
policy opinions, either to peers (e.g. sharing opinions on social media) or policymakers (e.g. 
contacting representatives, signing petitions). A second factor concerning involvement in 
environmental advocacy organizations was also identified (0.10 of variance explained), 
including via volunteering and donating money. Finally, participation in environmental 
demonstrations loaded onto a factor by itself. 
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the six latent factors representing types of 
environmental behaviors that were identified via the EFA described above. Though some 
variables are measured via Likert scales, others combine dichotomous measures, and 
participation in demonstrations is a single dichotomous measures, some basic inferences can 
be made. It is clear that people engage in household environmental behaviors more 
frequently than environmental consumer behaviors, and that participation in environmental 
political communications and with environmental organizations are both significantly more 
common than participation in demonstrations.  
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 In total, 86% of people indicated they perform household environmental behaviors 
most of the time or all the time, while only 28% of people made green consumer choices 
most or all of the time. Those compare to 39% of the sample who engaged in one of three 
communications behaviors in the past year; 22% who were involved with an environmental 
organization in the past year, either as a donor or a volunteer; and 3% who attended an 
environmental demonstration in the previous year. People were generally supportive of 
environmental policies, with 64% of the sample being generally supportive or strongly 
supportive of pro-environmental policies.   
 Table 4 presents a correlation matrix between the different types of environmental 
behavior identified via factor analysis. Nearly all behaviors that were measured are 
significantly and positively correlated with one another, though some have much stronger 
relationships than others. The two private-sphere environmental behaviors have the strongest 
relationship (r=0.28, p<0.05) of all behaviors. Environmental political communication 
behavior also has a strong positive association with environmental consumerism (r=0.26, 
p<.05). 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Cronbach’s ↵
Individual Values
Altruism 1,077 4.15 0.68 1.00 5.00 0.77
Biospherism 1,077 3.98 0.71 1.00 5.00 0.80
Egoism 1,077 3.16 0.88 1.00 5.00 0.68
Attitude Measures
NEP 1,074 3.30 0.86 1.00 5.00 0.64
Ideology 1,013 3.68 1.71 1.00 7.00 -
Political Interest 1,077 3.70 1.07 1.00 5.00 -
Table 2.2: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Environmental Behaviors, Study 1
Env Consumerism Household Env Env Political Comms Env Organizations Env Demonstrations Policy Support
Buy Green Consumer Goods 0.83 0.18 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.02
Buy Organic Produce 0.96 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.10 -0.04
Sort Recycling at Home -0.10 0.86 0.04 0.12 -0.07 0.06
Home Energy Conservation 0.19 0.80 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04
Contact Politician -0.12 0.09 0.71 0.03 0.24 -0.09
Sign Petition -.07 -0.11 0.75 -0.11 -0.04 0.10
Social Media 0.12 -.0.08 0.64 -0.08 0.01 0.01
Volunteer -0.12 0.09 -0.13 0.96 0.23 0.01
Donate 0.19 -0.07 0.19 0.45 -0.39 -0.03
Participate in Demonstration 0.15 -0.09 0.11 0.20 0.87 0.01
Support Pollution Regulation -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.91
Support Renewables Subsidies -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.87
Support Land Conservation 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.90
Support Threatened Species -0.10 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.88
Support Cap and Trade 0.17 -0.12 -0.06 0.03 0.08 0.83
SS Loadings 1.76 1.51 1.51 1.10 1.00 3.89
Prop Variance 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.26
Cum Variance 0.12 0.22 0.32 0.39 0.46 0.72
Cum Prop 0.16 0.30 0.44 0.55 0.64 1.00
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Environmental Behaviors, Study 1
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Env Consumerism 1,073 3.27 0.88 1.00 5.00
Household Env 1,075 4.43 0.63 1.50 5.00
Env Political Comms 1,077 0.55 0.78 0 3
Env Organizations 1,077 0.24 0.48 0 2
Env Demonstrations 1,077 0.03 0.17 0 1
Policy Support 1,077 4.01 0.86 1.00 5.00
1
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 The primary outlier among behaviors measured is participation in demonstrations. It 
is the only behavior that is not significantly correlated with all other behaviors – participation 
in demonstrations had no relationship with either household environmental actions or support 
for environmental policies.11 This supports the argument that attending demonstrations 
requires greater effort and risk, which distinguishes it from most other types of 
environmental behaviors (Stern et al. 1999). 
 Together, these results suggest that the three-factor model most commonly used to 
distinguish different types of environmental behavior may be insufficient. Although the six 
latent environmental behavior factors found in this analysis represents more than have been 
reported in previous studies intended to distinguish types of environmental behaviors, the 
factors identified are consistent with those commonly made by researchers in evaluating 
independent behaviors. Numerous studies have independently evaluated motivations, 
interventions, and other factors influencing purchase of green and organic products (e.g. Kim 
and Choi 2005; Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty; Hughner et al. 2007), household 
environmental conservation behavior (e.g. Poortinga, Steg, and Vlek 2004; Abrahamse et al. 
2005, 2007; Oskamp et al. 1991; Guagnano, Stern and Dietz 1995; McCarty and Shrum 
1994), involvement with environmental advocacy organizations (e.g. Han 2012; Bosso 
2003), and environmental public opinion and policy support (e.g. Dietz et al. 2007; Steg, 
Dreijerink, and Abrahamse 2005; Krosnick et al. 2006; Daniels et al. 2012). Though this 
study advances an effort to categorize environmental behaviors in ways that are consistent 
with past research, much additional work is required to establish an accepted, statistically-
																																								 																				
11 While only a small number of participants indicated they had attended a demonstration in the previous year 
(32 of 1077 total responses), this is not strictly an issue of statistical power. The size of the correlation between 
demonstrations and these, as well as most other behavioral measures, is comparatively low. 
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tested typology of environmental behavior. There is no such thing as “environmental 
behavior” – there are environmental behaviors, and those may organize into different types. 
Researchers need to consistently evaluate whether environmental behavior constructs 
meaningfully represent those types as explained by distinct factors, and if not they should 
make the effort to evaluate them separately, even if this is laborious. 
3.4.2 Relationships Between Values and Environmental Behaviors 
 To evaluate the relationships between individual characteristics and each of the six 
categories of environmental behavior identified above, I estimate a series of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression models. For each model, I also estimate the amount of variance 
explained, DR2, by each block of variables. This allows evaluation of the importance of 
demographic characteristics, values, and attitudes are for explaining each type of 
environmental behavior.12 Table 5 shows results from OLS regressions for environmental 
consumerism and household environmental behavior. Both models include values, attitudes, 
and control variables.13 Biospheric values increase the frequency that people engaged in both 
green consumer behaviors and household environmental behaviors, although the size of the 
effect of biospherism on environmental consumption is substantially larger than it is on 
household behaviors. The effects of altruism and egoism were not consistent across the two 
behaviors. Altruism increased household environmental behaviors, but had no significant 
																																								 																				
12 Note, of course, that the DR2 reported is influenced by the order in which each block of predictor variables is 
added to the model in the case of variables mediating the relationship between other variables and 
environmental behavior, as is predicted by the VBN. In some cases, adding values measures to the model before 
attitudes measures inflates the variance explained by values vis-à-vis a model in which attitudes were 
introduced first. I’ve chosen to present results as they are, with values antecedent to attitudes, based on existing 
environmental values literature. 
13 Due to concern over possible multicollinearity between the NEP and values, in particular biospherism and 
altruism, I tested for possible misspecification. To do so, I calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all 
covariates in each of the six models estimated, using the vif function from the package “car” in R. In no instance 
was any VIF above 2.0. This is well within the standard rules of thumb for acceptable VIFs (O’Brien 2007). 
However, separate models for values and attitudes are included in the appendix. 
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relationship with consumer behavior. The reverse is true for egoism. Egoism had a positive 
relationship with environmental consumer behavior, but no significant relationship with 
household behavior.  
 Results suggests differing motivations for each behavior – the fact that egoists were 
more likely than non-egoists to purchase environmental products suggests that green 
purchasing behaviors are perceived as offering some opportunity for personal gain. For 
household behaviors, however, egoism played no significant role. Environmental concern 
and political interest both increased green purchasing decisions, but had no impact on 
household behaviors. These results are consistent with expectations that consumer behaviors 
require a relatively high degree of effort and are therefore more likely to be performed by 
people who are invested in environmental outcomes and interested in politics. Surprisingly, 
Democrats were less likely to perform environmental consumer behaviors, while 
Republicans were less likely to perform household environmental behaviors. Overall, the 
model explained much more variance in environmental consumer behavior than household 
behavior. One possible reason is household behaviors may be largely motivated by habit, 
leading social-psychological motivators like values to be less important for explaining such 
behaviors. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 Table 6 shows results of OLS models to estimate effects of the same variables on 
environmental policy support and environmental communications behaviors.14 Biospherism 
significantly increases both behaviors, while altruism only increases environmental 
communications behaviors. However, analysis of the difference in effects of altruism across 
																																								 																				
14 A negative binomial model to estimate engagement in environmental political communication behaviors 
showed very similar results. The results of that model can be found in the appendix. 
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the two behaviors using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) suggest that this difference 
is not statistically significant at p<0.05 (c2(1) = 2.89, p=.09), suggesting that it would be 
inappropriate to draw conclusions about motivations based on this distinction. Egoism 
significantly decreases environmental policy support, though it has no effect on political 
communications. This suggests people who are primarily concerned with their own well-
being may be just as willing as non-egoists to actively speak out in favor of their preferred 
environmental policies, but are less willing to provide tacit support for government policies 
to address environmental problems. Though far from conclusive, one potential reason is that 
policy opinions offer no opportunity for personal benefit, while actions like sharing opinions 
with friends or signing petitions, particularly if such actions are visible, could plausibly offer 
relational or reputational advantages (Brick, Sherman, and Kim 2017). 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 Attitudes are also important predictors of both policy support and communications 
actions. Ideology and environmental orientation each significantly increase policy support 
and environmental communications. This is because people largely rely on their ideological 
beliefs to inform policy opinions. Political interest increased respondents’ communications 
activities, though it had no impact policy support. As with the comparison between consumer 
and household behaviors, political interest appears to be an important motivator of high-
effort actions, but does not significantly influence behaviors that are less personally costly. 
  Values play a much smaller role in explaining more activist environmental political 
behaviors like involvement with environmental advocacy organizations or attendance at 
environmental demonstrations. Table 7 shows models estimating variation in these two types 
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of environmental political activism.15 Biospherism increases engagement with environmental 
organizations, but plays no role in explaining attendance at demonstrations. Neither altruism 
nor egoism explain significant variance in either form of activist behavior. Moreover, the 
total variance explained by values is extremely small in both models, as compared to the 
other four models evaluated thus far.  
 Similar to values, attitudes have only a small effect on environmental activism. 
Political interest increases the likelihood that people participate in demonstrations, but no 
other attitude or political measure had any impact on activism. Though both models 
contribute to explaining environmental political activism (F(17)=4.58, p<.001 for 
organization participation, F(17)=3.05, p<.001 for the environmental demonstrations 
model), the total amount of variance explained is small. This is consistent with past research 
showing activist behaviors are more difficult to model with survey data and participation in 
such actions may rely more heavily on contextual factors (Stern et al. 1999; Stern 2000). 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 Taken together, these results show that values play distinct roles in explaining 
different types of environmental behaviors. Table 8 summarizes the effects of each value on 
all six different environmental behaviors evaluated. These results are presented in Tables 5-7, 
but these figures place the effects of each value in one place.  
																																								 																				
15 Linear models were specified using the same predictors as in Table 5. Analysis using a negative binomial 
model to estimate environmental organization involvement and logistic model for demonstrations found very 
similar results to those presented below. Results of both models can be found in the appendix. 
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 Altruism has a positive and significant effect on household environmental behaviors 
and environmental communications, but does not influence the other four categories of 
environmental behaviors. Egoists are more likely to engage in green consumer behavior, less 
likely to support environmental policies. Egoism has no significant effect on the other four 
types of behavior. Finally, biospherism has the most consistent effects on different 
environmental behaviors. Biospherists were more likely to engage in all types of 
environmental behavior other than attending demonstrations. 
3.5. Discussion 
 Results show that existing frameworks for understanding environmental behaviors 
may underestimate the number of latent environmental behavior categories present among 
those actions that people regularly engage in. Regression results suggest the six distinct types 
of environmental behavior identified in exploratory factor analysis (EFA) are not uniformly 
motivated by the same social-psychological factors. Biospherism has the most consistent, 
positive effects on environmental behaviors; only participation in demonstrations was 
unaffected by individuals’ biospheric value orientations. This indicates, unsurprisingly, that 
people who are concerned about the well-being of nature are nearly all types of 
environmental behavior. Altruism, however, only increased participation in environmental 
communication behaviors and household environmental behaviors. As compared to public 
Table 2.8: Summarizing E↵ects of Values on Each Environmental Behavior
Green Consumerism Household Env Env Political Comms Policy Support Env Organizations Env Demonstrations
Altruism 0.003 0.11⇤⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.09 0.03  0.01
Biospherism 0.44⇤⇤⇤ 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤ 0.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤ 0.02
Egoism 0.14⇤⇤⇤  0.04 0.02  0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.02 0.01
 R2 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
Table 2.9: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Environmental Behaviors - Study 2
Private Behaviors - Home Private Behaviors - Organic Produce Policy Support
Recycling/Reducing Waste 0.81 -0.05 0.00
Home Energy Conservation 0.68 0.01 0.08
Buy Green Consumer Goods 0.53 0.40 0.01
Buy Organic Produce 0.01 0.87 0.02
Support Renewables Subsidies -0.01 -0.03 0.88
Support Cap and Trade 0.05 -0.04 0.79
Support Pollution Regulation 0.05 -0.04 0.85
Write Politician 0.12 0.12 0.12
SS Loadings 1.58 1.08 2.20
Prop Variance 0.20 0.14 0.28
Cum Variance 0.19 0.33 0.61
Prop Explained 0.33 0.22 0.45
Cum Prop 0.33 0.55 1.00
Note: Wri ing to politici ns does not load onto any of the three factors su ciently. As a result,
it will be evaluated independently.
Table 2.10: Summary Statistics of Environmental Behaviors, Study 2
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Env Consumerism 455 3.55 0.97 1.00 5.00
Household Env 455 4.23 0.84 1.00 5.00
Policy Support 452 4.00 0.90 1.00 5.00
Env Political Comms 459 0.21 0.41 0 1
6
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activist behaviors and environmental consumerism, household behaviors and 
communications are generally considered to require relatively low effort. Low-cost behaviors 
are often found to be motivated by normative concerns like altruism and biospherism a 
greater extent than high-cost environmental behaviors (Tobler et al. 2012; Stern 2000). 
 Results in the present study provide mixed support for that assertion. The highest-
effort behaviors, in particular attending demonstrations and affiliation with environmental 
advocacy organizations, were least influenced by individuals’ values. However, 
environmental consumer behaviors were more impacted than other behaviors, though they 
require more effort or other personal cost than behaviors like policy support. Additional 
research regarding the mediating effect of effort on the relationship between values and 
different environmental behaviors is necessary.  
 Egoism had mostly null effects on environmental behavior, which is consistent with 
findings regarding the relationship between egoism and general political participation 
explained in the previous chapter of this dissertation. However, egoism had a surprisingly 
positive effect on environmental consumer behavior. This indicates people may actually 
perceive environmental consumption as personally beneficial, in spite of that fact that it 
generally involves paying higher costs to protect the environment, a public good. The 
number of analyses performed and lack of consistency in effects of egoism make this finding 
only preliminary, but it demands additional inquiry.  
 The effects of political attitudes and interest on different behaviors are also 
noteworthy. In particular, political interest predicted environmental consumerism, both forms 
of environmental political activism, and environmental communications behavior; however, 
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it had no effect on household behaviors or support for environmental policies. This suggests 
that interest in politics is most important for motivating high-cost environmental behaviors.  
4. Study Two: Changing Environmental Behaviors Through Targeted Values Messages 
 Because values help define relationships between what people care about and the 
specific pro-environmental behaviors they engage in, they may also help policymakers and 
environmental advocates target specific behavior changes. Relevant message frames change 
policy opinions and behavior by shifting the focus of a decision to a specific consideration 
highlighted in the frame (for a review, see Chong and Druckman 2007; see also Slothuus and 
De Vreese 2010; Verplanken & Holland 2002). Frames can function as heuristics, which are 
mental shortcuts that enable individuals to make decisions without requiring a more 
cognitively demanding process of weighing the broad implications of an action (see Brewer 
and Gross 2005; Feldman and Zaller 1992). Values-focused messages may be uniquely 
effective for changing opinion and behavior because they allow messages to tap “morally 
relevant intuitions” (Nisbet, Markowitz, and Kotcher 2012: 17; Brewer and Gross 2005). 
 To test whether messages that highlight outcomes in line with altruistic, biospheric, 
and egoistic values motivate behaviors related to those values, I use a message framing 
experiment that presents value-framed messages regarding the threat of climate change, as 
well as a control message that provides the same information without referencing value-
framed outcomes. The egoism-framed message highlights the potential harm to the 
participant personally if nothing is done, with the intention of making the reader consider 
potential personal harm when deciding whether to perform environmental behaviors aimed at 
addressing climate change. The altruism-framed message highlights potential harm to other 
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people caused by climate change, while the biospherism-framed message highlights potential 
harm to animals and ecosystems.  
 Based on the relationships between value orientations and categories of pro-
environmental behavior identified in Study 1, I expect messages highlighting biospheric 
reasons for engaging in pro-environmental behavior would increase willingness to perform 
all types of environmental behavior; altruistic frames would increase environmental policy 
support and willingness to perform low-cost behaviors like household environmental actions 
and political communications; and egoistic messages would increase willingness to perform 
environmental consumer behaviors, but decrease support for pro-environmental policies. 
4.1. Pre-Testing the Framing Experiment 
 Prior to fielding the full survey experiment, I performed two pre-tests to evaluate 
whether people were able to successfully differentiate messages that framed climate change 
in altruistic, egoistic, and biospheric terms. In pre-tests on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) in June 2015 (N=291) and September 2015 (N=217), I provided participants with a 
mock news article to read and asked them to identify whether the argument being made 
related primarily to how climate change would impact them, other people, or nature. To 
evaluate whether people could successfully identify the type of argument presented, 
participants were asked to select one of three summaries of the argument they had just read. 
Response options included, a) “Climate change needs to be addressed to avoid negative 
consequences for people around the world” (altruistic treatment); b) “Climate change needs 
to be addressed to avoid negative consequences to the planet and its ecosystems” (biospheric 
treatment); and c) “Climate change needs to be addressed to avoid negative consequences to 
myself and others like me” (egoistic treatment). Treatment assignment significantly predicted 
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which category of argument participants identified (c2(4) = 149.87, p<.001). In all, 80% of 
people who read the altruistic argument correctly identified it, while 14% thought it was a 
biospheric message and 6% thought it was an egoistic message; 69% of people who read a 
biospheric argument correctly identified it, while 27% incorrectly categorized it as altruistic 
and 5% identified it as egoistic. People were more confused by the egoistic argument, 
probably because it is hardest to make an egoistic argument regarding something that many 
people think of as impacting everyone and everything, like climate change. Only 40% of 
people who received the egoistic argument correctly categorized it, while 50% categorized it 
as altruistic and 10% categorized it at biospheric. These results make clear that people can 
distinguish between social-altruistic and biospheric arguments rather easily, but that 
distinguishing egoistic arguments from altruistic ones is more difficult. The results also 
suggested that arguments in the egoistic message included some altruistic language, which 
was addressed prior to fielding the full survey experiment. 
 I was also interested in evaluating whether certain frames were interpreted as more 
effective than others. Participants were asked, “Independent of your personal opinion on the 
threat of climate change, how forceful of an argument did the article make regarding the need 
to address climate change?” Responses were measured on a Likert-type scale from 
“Forceful” (5) to “Not at all forceful” (1). Though asking about “forcefulness” may not be a 
perfect measure of message effectiveness, it was used to avoid use of language that implied 
agreement with the message. There were significant differences in reported forcefulness of 
the arguments made in the three messages (c2(12) = 67.90, p<.001). Biospheric messages 
were most forceful, with 63% saying of people receiving that message indicating it was 
“forceful” or “very forceful.” In spite of confusion over identifying the type of message, 59% 
   70 
of people who received the egoistic message said it was “forceful” or “very forceful.” The 
altruistic language, which was most easily recognized, was also weakest of value frame in the 
pre-test. Only 49% of people receiving the altruistic frame found it “forceful” or “very 
forceful.” In response, I edited the message in an attempt to increase the perceived urgency 
of addressing climate change to prevent harm to people around the world. All of these were 
perceived to be more forceful than the control. Only 30% of respondents in the control 
condition indicated it was either “forceful” or “very forceful.” 
 Pre-tests confirmed that people were able to distinguish different treatments as 
anticipated and that the messages were generally considered to be effective means of relaying 
the threat of climate change. Language in the final framing experiment attempted to address 
both concerns over respondents’ abilities to distinguish value-framed messages from one 
another, and attempted to strengthen frames that people found less forceful. Together, pre-
test results supported moving forward with the message framing experiment. 
4.2. Procedure  
 Participants were recruited to participate in the field experiment from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in April 2016 (N=452). Participants began by answering the same 
values questions that they were asked in Study 1, via the Portrait Values Questionnaire 
(PVQ; Schwartz 2003). Although asking values questions first meant participants could have 
been primed prior to treatment, this was the only way to reliably measure values. Also, if 
participants were primed by values questions, it would be evenly distributed across the 
sample and would be likely to increase the potential effect of messages that match 
individuals’ value priorities. After answering the PVQ, participants were assigned to one of 
four experimental conditions in which they read a mock newspaper article that outlined 
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potential threats posed by climate change if the government fails to change policy and 
highlighted impacts of climate change on other people, on the individual, or on the earth and 
its ecosystems. The control condition presented the same information without value-framed 
impacts. After reading the newspaper article, participants were asked to commit to 
performing a number of environmental behaviors. These included everyday actions that 
could reduce their carbon footprint, which measured different types of private environmental 
behavior; a request to pause during the survey and write a letter to their Member of Congress, 
which measured public environmental activism; and they were asked to indicate support for a 
climate change-related policy proposals. 
 The sample was well-balanced along of a number of demographic measures. Forty-
eight percent of respondents self-identified as female and 52% self-identified male. Median 
household income was between $40,000-$65,000, which is consistent with the U.S. median 
household income of about $52,000. Eighty-six percent of respondents had at least a high 
school diploma or GED, as compared to 88% of U.S. residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). 
Where the sample differs significantly from U.S. population averages is regarding ideology 
and party identification. Fifty-two percent of respondents self-identified as “very liberal,” 
“liberal,” or “somewhat liberal,” while only 27% self-identified as “very conservative,” 
“conservative,” or “somewhat conservative.” Similarly, 47% identify as Democrats while 
only 18% identify as Republicans. 
4.3. Measures 
 Environmental behavior. Questions were developed to evaluate participants’ 
willingness to engage in a range of environmental behaviors related to the issue of climate 
change, which was the focus of the newspaper articles they read in treatment. In most cases, 
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behavioral measures mirrored questions from Study 1, although in some cases asking 
identical questions was impossible.16 To measure environmental political behavior, 
participants were asked, “Some people make their voice heard on climate change by 
contacting their elected representatives directly. Would you be willing to take one minute 
right now to write a letter to your Congressional representative to let them know how you 
feel about this issue?” This provided participants an opportunity to engage in environmental 
political communications. Responses were coded as binary. Participants were also asked 
about their support for three climate change policies, including their support for government 
intervention via cap-and-trade, providing subsidies for renewable energy, and regulation of 
pollution. Responses were recorded on a Likert scale from “Strongly Oppose” (1) “Strongly 
Support” (5). Private environmental behavior questions were nearly identical to those used in 
Study 1. Participants were told, “We are collaborating on the Earth Month Project, in which 
we ask people to reduce their personal impact on climate change over the next month. The 
program is aimed at making a real difference by asking people to commit to reducing their 
individual carbon footprint during the course of the challenge.” They were then asked to 
commit to reducing their personal carbon footprint by buying more organic product, buying 
more green consumer products, conserving home energy, and recycling. Responses were 
recorded on a Likert-style scale from “Definitely able to do this” (5) to “Definitely not able 
to do this” (5).  Table 9 shows an exploratory factor analysis of the behavioral measures 
included in Study 2.  
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
																																								 																				
16 For example, to measure public activist behaviors in Study 1, I asked respondents whether they had engaged 
in those behaviors in the previous 12 months. This would not have been a plausible way to evaluate the effects 
of a message framing experiment on political activism. 
   73 
 Environmental political activism, which was measured via a request for participants 
to write to politicians, did not load onto sufficiently onto any of the three factors, and is 
analyzed independently (µ = 0.21). Private behavior questions loaded slightly differently than 
in study 1, with organic purchasing representing its own factor and purchase of green 
products loading with household behaviors. 17 However, to maintain continuity with Study 1, 
environmental consumerism (µ = 3.55, Cronbach’s a = .75) and household behaviors (µ = 
4.23, Cronbach’s a = .64) will be evaluated separately. Climate change policy support loaded 
onto a single factor and thus a single measure of policy support was constructed (µ = 4.00, 
Cronbach’s a = .84). Table 10 shows summary statistics for the environmental behavior 
measures. As with study 1, household behaviors were more common than environmental 
consumer behaviors. People were generally supportive of pro-environmental climate policies, 
which is also consistent with findings from study 1. 
 
 Treatment Messages. The newspaper articles presented to participants were meant to 
elicit concerns related to altruism, egoism, and biospherism, respectively. The control 
condition presented the same information about climate threats but did not reference to its 
																																								 																				
17 When performing factor analysis on the four private behavior independent of other behavioral measures, 
results suggest separating them into two latent factors organized as household and consumer behaviors. 
Table 2.8: Summarizing E↵ects of Values on Each Environmental Behavior
Green Consumerism Household Env Env Political Comms Policy Support Env Organizations Env Demonstrations
Altruism 0.003 0.11⇤⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.09 0.03  0.01
Biospherism 0.44⇤⇤⇤ 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤ 0.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤ 0.02
Egoism 0.14⇤⇤⇤  0.04 0.02  0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.02 0.01
 R2 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
Table 2.9: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Environmental Behaviors - Study 2
Private Behaviors - Home Private Behaviors - Organic Produce Policy Support
Recycling/Reducing Waste 0.81 -0.05 0.00
Home Energy Conservation 0.68 0.01 0.08
Buy Green Consumer Goods 0.53 0.40 0.01
Buy Organic Produce 0.01 0.87 0.02
Support Renewables Subsidies -0.01 -0.03 0.88
Support Cap and Trade 0.05 -0.04 0.79
Support Pollution Regulation 0.05 -0.04 0.85
Write Politician 0.12 0.12 0.12
SS Loadings 1.58 1.08 2.20
Prop Variance 0.20 0.14 0.28
Cum Variance 0.19 0.33 0.61
Prop Explained 0.33 0.22 0.45
Cum Prop 0.33 0.55 1.00
Note: Writing to politicians does not load onto any of the three factors su ciently. As a result,
it will be evaluated independently.
Table 2.10: Summary Statistics of Environmental Behaviors, Study 2
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Env Consumerism 455 3.55 0.97 1.00 5.00
Household Env 455 4.23 0.84 1.00 5.00
Policy Support 452 4.00 0.90 1.00 5.00
Env Political Comms 459 0.21 0.41 0 1
6
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effects on any target group or individual. Language used for each message can be found in 
the appendix. 
 Individual Values. Individual values were measured via the PVQ,18 and measures of 
altruism (µ = 3.97, Cronbach’s a = .86), egoism (µ = 2.88, Cronbach’s a = .64), and 
biospherism (µ = 3.74, Cronbach’s a=.88) were all constructed. A factor analysis of PVQ 
responses indicated three separate factor loadings, one for each value. Results of that factor 
analysis can be found in the appendix.  
 Additional Covariates. Environmental orientation was measured via the eleven-
question New Ecological Paradigm (NEP; Dunlap et al. 2000). Previous research has 
questioned the validity of the NEP as a unidimensional measure of environmental attitudes 
(Amburgey and Thoman, 2012), and in this case factor analysis revealed that the eleven 
items did not all load onto a single factor. Moreover, the NEP provides a well-understood 
means of incorporating environmental orientation in analysis of survey data, and given the 
importance of being able to use surveys to measure environmental orientation in some way I 
have chosen to combine the five measures into a single measure of environmental concern (µ 
= 3.32, Cronbach’s a = .74). Additional covariates of interest were measured the same as in 
study 1 and include political interest, ideology, and party affiliation. 
 Control Measures. Nearly all the same demographic controls were included in Study 
2 as in Study 1. Education, income, gender, age, and race are all measured as in Study 1. 
Rural or urban residency was not measured, and thus is not included in analysis. 
4.3. Results 
																																								 																				
18 Factor analysis of values measures can be seen in the appendix. 
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 Table 11 shows mean effects of treatment assignment on the four environmental 
behavior measures. Altruistic and egoistic frames consistently outperform both the biospheric 
frame and the control frame. However, ANOVA revealed that none of the treatments had 
statistically significant effects on environmental behaviors.19  
 
 In spite of non-significant results, it is compelling that willingness to engage in all 
environmental actions was higher among participants who read altruistic or egoistic 
messages, as compared to people who read biospheric messages. This presents the possibility 
that while people who value biospherism may be most likely to be motivated to engage in 
environmental behaviors, messages focused on how environmental protection benefits them 
or benefits others may be more effective than those focused on benefits to nature.  
4.4. Discussion 
 In this study, message frames that focused on how climate change might affect people 
broadly (i.e. altruistic goals), the individual reading the message (i.e. egoistic goals), and the 
																																								 																				
19 In addition, I evaluated whether treatment assignment influenced environmental behavior broadly via 
MANOVA, which revealed no statistical relationship between treatment assignment and environmental 
behavior (Pillai’s Trace = 0.005, F =0.595, df = (447), p = .67). Post-hoc power analysis reveals that, for linear 
models estimating each type of behavior, a sample of approximately N=992 would be required to identify at 
least one significant treatment effect for each model. 
Table 2.11: Willingness to Engage in Environmental Behaviors, By Message
Frame
Mean Stated Willingness to Engage in Behavior
(Env Consumerism) (Env Household Behavior) (Public Activism) (Policy Support)
Altruistic Frame 3.62 4.26 0.23 4.14
(0.94) (0.83) (0.42) (0.83)
Egoistic Frame 3.60 4.40 0.22 4.00
(1.01) (0.75) (0.42) (0.82)
Biospheric Frame 3.45 4.10 0.20 3.91
(1.06) (0.94) (0.40) (0.99)
Control Frame 3.54 4.14 0.18 3.95
(0.89) (0.80) (0.38) (0.88)
7
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natural world (i.e. biospheric goals) did not differ significantly from a control frame in terms 
of their influence on people’s willingness to engage in environmental behaviors to address 
climate change. Messages highlighting egoistic and altruistic goals appeared to be more 
effective than either biospheric or control messages, but those results were imprecise. If 
future research can convincingly show that egoistic and altruistic messages have larger 
overall effects, this would suggest that while people who value the well-being of nature are 
most likely to engage in environmental behaviors, messages that are consistent with those 
values are not necessarily the most effective means of mobilizing people.  
5. General Discussion 
 In this paper, I began by evaluating the empirical structure of environmental behavior 
through an exploratory factor analysis of ten self-reported environmental behaviors and five 
policy support measures. I found more categories of environmental behavior than are 
typically used in evaluating environmental behavior. I found latent factors for environmental 
consumerism, household environmental behavior, participation in environmental 
demonstrations, participation with environmental advocacy organizations, environmental 
communications behavior, and support for environmental policies. The presence of diverse 
opportunities for environmental action has implications for environmental protection broadly, 
as well as whose environmental interests and concerns are represented by government and 
industry. Diverse participatory opportunities offer citizens the chance to influence outcomes 
and express beliefs with respect to how society should prioritize environmental protection, 
and can improve representational disparities if citizens feel they cannot adequately articulate 
through traditional political channels (Togeby 1993).  
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 After establishing six dimensions of environmental behavior, I evaluated how 
individuals’ values and other social-psychological covariates explain and motivate each of 
these dimensions. I found that biospheric values and environmental orientation increase 
nearly all dimensions of environmental behavior, while altruism only increased fairly low-
effort behaviors including household action and environmental communications behavior. 
Egoism had a surprisingly positive effect on environmental consumerism and a decreased 
support for pro-environmental behaviors, but otherwise did not influence environmental 
behavior. One opportunity for future work lies in evaluating how altruism and egoism each 
influence environmental consumer behavior and household environmental behavior 
differently. The different relationships each of these behaviors were found to have with 
altruism and egoism in this study suggest a potentially major rift in what motivates different 
types of private environmental behaviors. A better understanding of this distinction could 
provide important information to policymakers, environmental advocates, and marketers 
attempting to promote more environmentally responsible everyday behaviors. 
 The survey experiment in study 2 tested whether highlighting values could effectively 
mobilize behavior. Egoistic and altruistic messages appeared to be broadly more effective at 
encouraging pro-environmental behavior than the biospheric message, but these results were 
not significant and demand additional study. Understanding the effects of value-framed 
messages on environmental behavior is important because it provides opportunities to target 
individuals’ values and specific behaviors that may be motivated by those values, but also 
because people’s reasons for being engaged on environmental issues have implications for 
intentions to engage in other or future actions (i.e. spillover). Altruistic and biospheric 
motivations tend to contribute to positive spillover from one environmental behavior to 
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another, while self-interested motivations are unlikely to do so (Evans et al. 2012; Thogersen 
and Crompton 2009). When people are encouraged to perform environmental actions for 
their own self-interest (i.e. conserve home electricity to save money), there is less 
opportunity to affirm one’s identity in a way that might encourage future actions absent 
continued personal benefits. The fact that consumer environmental actions may be motivated 
by egoistic values, as shown in study 1, suggests that such behaviors may not always be an 
effective way of moving people toward other forms of environmental activism. 
 This paper challenges a number of assumptions regarding how researchers think 
about environmental behavior. While the relationship between individual characteristics and 
environmental behavior has been explored extensively, the nature of what we call 
“environmental behavior” requires additional research in order to better understand the 
nature of such behaviors and how to influence them. There is no accepted understanding of 
how environmental behaviors are organized, and I have only presented a few possible options 
for such organization, and significantly more research is required to establish how behaviors 
should be distinguished from one another. 
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Table 2.5: Predicting Private Environmental Behaviors with Values and Atti-
tudes
Green Consumerism Household Environmentalism
(1) (2)
Demographic Controls
Education 0.05⇤  0.003
(0.02) (0.02)
Income 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
Age  0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.001)
Gender: Female  0.07 0.02
(0.06) (0.05)
Race: Black  0.001  0.04
(0.15) (0.11)
Race: Latino 0.15⇤ 0.01
(0.08) (0.06)
Race: Asian 0.12  0.03
(0.08) (0.06)
Race: American Indian 0.14 0.12
(0.12) (0.09)
Residency: Rural 0.13⇤ 0.01
(0.07) (0.05)
 R2 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
Individual Values
Altruism 0.003 0.11⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.04)
Biospherism 0.44⇤⇤⇤ 0.19⇤⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.04)
Egoism 0.14⇤⇤⇤  0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
 R2 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤
Attitudes
NEP 0.07⇤ 0.02
(0.04) (0.03)
Ideology: Conservative  0.02  0.0005
(0.02) (0.02)
Political Interest 0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.005
(0.03) (0.02)
Party ID: Democrat  0.19⇤⇤  0.09
(0.07) (0.06)
Party ID: Republican  0.12  0.11⇤
(0.08) (0.06)
 R2 0.03⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤⇤
Constant 0.42 3.00⇤⇤⇤
(0.29) (0.22)
Observations 842 842
R2 0.27 0.13
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.11
Residual Std. Error 0.77 (df = 823) 0.60 (df = 824)
F Statistic 16.62⇤⇤⇤ (df = 18; 823) 6.93⇤⇤⇤ (df = 17; 824)
Note: Models are both linear.
⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
3
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Table 2.6: Predicting Environmental Policy Support and Policy Communica-
tions with Values and Attitudes
Policy Support Environmental Commmunications
(1) (2)
Demographic Controls
Education 0.04⇤ 0.001
(0.02) (0.02)
Income 0.03  0.003
(0.01) (0.01)
Gender: Female 0.25⇤⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.06)
Age 0.002  0.004⇤
(0.002) (0.002)
Race: Black  0.38⇤⇤  0.10
(0.14) (0.14)
Race: Latino 0.02 0.02
(0.08) (0.07)
Race: Asian 0.17⇤  0.04
(0.08) (0.07)
Race: American Indian 0.01 0.08
(0.12) (0.11)
Residency: Rural  0.05 0.06
(0.07) (0.06)
 R2 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤⇤
Values
Altruism 0.09 0.13⇤⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.04)
Biospherism 0.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤
(0.05) (0.04)
Egoism  0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
 R2 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤
Attitudes
NEP 0.16⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.03)
Ideology: Conservative  0.09⇤⇤⇤  0.05⇤
(0.02) (0.02)
Political Interest  0.03 0.10⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.03)
Party ID: Republican  0.02  0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
Party ID: Democrat 0.07  0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
 R2 0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤
Constant 2.63⇤⇤⇤  1.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.29) (0.27)
Observations 844 844
R2 0.25 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.16
Residual Std. Error (df = 826) 0.77 0.72
F Statistic (df = 17; 826) 16.19⇤⇤⇤ 10.32⇤⇤⇤
Note: Models are both linear. A negative binomial model to estimate
policy communications actions are shown in the appendix.
⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
4
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Table 2.7: Predicting Participation with Environmental Organizations and
Demonstrations with Values and Attitudes
Env Organization Participation Env Demonstration Participation
(1) (2)
Demographic Controls
Education 0.02 0.01⇤
(0.01) (0.005)
Income 0.02⇤  0.002
(0.01) (0.003)
Gender: Female  0.08⇤  0.01
(0.04) (0.01)
Age  0.002  0.001⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.0004)
Race: Black  0.04 0.03
(0.09) (0.03)
Race: Latino 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.02)
Race: Asian 0.08 0.02
(0.05) (0.02)
Race: American Indian  0.10 0.002
(0.07) (0.03)
Residency: Rural  0.01  0.01
(0.04) (0.01)
 R2 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤⇤
Values
Altruism 0.03  0.01
(0.03) (0.01)
Biospherism 0.07⇤ 0.02
(0.03) (0.01)
Egoism 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
 R2 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
Attitudes
NEP 0.03 0.003
(0.02) (0.01)
Ideology: Conservative  0.01  0.01
(0.01) (0.005)
Political Interest 0.02 0.02⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.01)
Party ID: Republican  0.03  0.01
(0.05) (0.02)
Party ID: Democrat  0.01  0.01
(0.04) (0.02)
 R2 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
Constant  0.39⇤  0.08
(0.17) (0.06)
Observations 844 844
R2 0.09 0.06
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.04
Residual Std. Error (df = 826) 0.46 0.17
F Statistic (df = 17; 826) 4.58⇤⇤⇤ 3.05⇤⇤⇤
Note: Models are both linear, including a LPM to estimate probability of participation
in demonstrations. A negative binomial model for group participation and
a logistic model for demonstrating are both shown in the appendix.
⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
5
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Abstract 
 
Environmental managers face major challenges regarding how to communicate 
the value of environmental policies and projects to the public. Effective communication 
can increase public and political support and mitigate opposition. In this study, we field a 
framing experiment that utilizes a two (economic, ecological) by two (gain, loss) factorial 
design to evaluate how messages highlighting different goals invasive species 
management influence public support for the proposed project. We find that ecological 
messages lead to significantly more support for invasive species management than 
economic frames and loss frames are more effective than gain frames. The interaction 
between ecological frames and loss frames are the most effective combination. We also 
find that treatment responses differ across several covariates; ecological messages were 
more effective among liberals and people who were deeply concerned about the 
environment, while ecological and economic messages performed equally well among 
conservatives and people less concerned with protecting the environment. Results also 
offer insight regarding how the public perceives policy risk when faced with new 
government policies generally, and new environmental regulations in particular. 
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Economic Losses or Environmental Gains? 
Framing Effects on Public Support for Environmental Management  
 
Introduction 
 
Active management of environmental resources offers substantial and diverse public 
benefits. However, how environmental managers should communicate the value of their 
work to maximize public support remains largely unknown. Public opinion can play an 
important role in the success or failure of proposed environmental policies; public opposition 
or indifference can threaten to delay or completely derail environmental projects (Bertolino 
and Genovesi 2003; Beierle 1999; Eden 1996; O’Faircheallaigh 2010), while support can 
provide important political capital to elected officials or environmental managers intending 
as they implement environmental projects (Stern et al. 1999). Better communication 
strategies can help public environmental agencies and their advocates communicate the value 
of their work in ways that help ensure projects are funded and successfully implemented. 
Ecological and economic benefits represent the two primary goals of environmental 
management. As a result, they also encompass two of the most common arguments in favor 
of environmental protection, and the public is generally familiar with ecological and 
economic frames in environmental policy discourse (Bolsen 2011; Ansolabehere and 
Konisky 2012). Ecological message frames highlight the need to protect the environment for 
the sake of its animals and ecosystems. Economic message frames focus on how 
environmental protection benefit human economic activity. Environmental communications 
can also be framed as providing opportunities for gains or protecting against losses. Gain-
framed messages highlight anticipated increases in economic activity or ecological health as 
a result of a program. Loss-framed messages, on the other hand, highlight how government 
environmental projects prevent ecological or economic damages.  
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In this paper, we present the results of a survey experiment of California residents 
(N=1077) that utilizes a two (economic, ecological) by two (gain, loss) factorial design. An 
online sample was gathered by Qualtrics using quota sampling, which resulted in a sample 
that closely approximates the California statewide population across a number of 
demographic characteristics including household income, party identification, and age. We 
also oversampled rural residents to evaluate whether their opinions on invasive species 
management, and how they responded to communications related to that project, differed 
significantly from urban residents. The factorial design of the experiment allows us to 
determine whether gain and loss frames interact with ecological and economic frames as well 
as how each performs independently to promote support for environmental management. 
Existing research regarding the efficacy of similar frames on public opinion is almost entirely 
focused on climate change (Spence and Pidgeon 2010; Bertolotti and Catellani 2014). This 
study provides new information for environmental managers and advocates regarding how 
people respond to messages about important but comparatively low-profile and non-partisan 
environmental policy issues. 
We find that people who read a message highlighting the ecological benefits were 
significantly more supportive of the project than people who read about its economic 
benefits. These results suggest that the public is more concerned with protecting the 
environment as a means of influencing ecological outcomes than economic ones. We also 
find that when benefits are framed as preventing losses people are significantly more 
supportive when comparable benefits are framed in terms of expected gains. Responses to 
treatment messages differed significantly based on a number of individual-level covariates, 
including political ideology and environmental concern. Ecological messages were more 
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effective among liberals and people who were deeply concerned about the environment, 
while ecological and economic messages performed equally well among conservatives and 
people less concerned with protecting the environment. These results contribute to an 
ongoing discourse regarding whether direct benefits to the environment motivate support for 
environmental protection or whether human-focused economic co-benefits are necessary to 
motivate support for environmental policies. Analysis of gain and loss frames also 
demonstrate the efficacy of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) in the context of 
environmental public goods problems, and offer insight regarding how people interpret the 
relative risk of new political action versus non-action in addressing environmental issues. 
Using Frames in Environmental Communication 
Environmental management suffers when agencies are unable to communicate the 
importance of environmental protection in ways that convince the public or their elected 
representatives of their value (Tanentzap et al. 2009, Crowley et al. 2017). Effectively 
framing policy issues can increase political interest and participation and build trust and 
collaboration between the public and government. This in turn can improve the quality and 
perceived legitimacy of agency decisions (Nisbet et al. 2012). One way to overcome public 
misunderstanding of management goals (McNeely 2001) or lack of support or interest in 
environmental management is through effectively framing the issue in ways that are more 
relevant and understandable for the public (Popkin 1994; Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and 
Oxley 1999; Nisbet et al. 2012).  
Frames influence decision-making and have the ability to change policy opinions by 
both making a certain consideration more accessible and influencing the weight given to the 
accessed concept in the decision process (Nelson et al. 1997), rather than simply introducing 
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new information to the audience of the frame (i.e. simple persuasion) or by purely making a 
particular consideration more accessible in a moment of decision or action (i.e. prime). By 
doing so, frames make policy issues not only more immediately accessible but also make the 
considerations underlying them more salient (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Nelson et al. 1997; 
Brewer 2001; Lakoff 2010; Chong and Druckman 2007; Popkin 1994). However, the 
psychological processes by which attribute frames and outcome frames influence decision-
making and opinion formation appear to be different. By altering the context in which a 
choice is presented, attribute frames target specific beliefs and “lend additional weight to an 
already accessible concept by influencing its perceived relevance or importance” (Nelson et 
al. 1997: 228; Chong and Druckman 2007). This “conscious weighting of alternative 
considerations” distinguishes the psychological processes by which attribute frames 
influence decisions from those of outcome frames (Druckman 2004: 674; Nelson et al. 1997). 
Outcome frames influence decision-making through accessibility processes that by which 
gain and loss frames make positive or negative associations more immediately accessible, 
respectively (Druckman 2004; Levin et al. 1998). Thus, loss frames associated with species 
invasion would make negative associations with destruction of native species more 
accessible, while gain frames would make positive feelings regarding restoration of native 
species more accessible. 
Modifying Attribute Frames: Ecological and Economic Impacts 
In this study, attribute frames differ based on the ecological or economic impacts 
highlighted in communicating the goals of an invasive species management project. Existing 
environmental communications research has evaluated how problem definition and proposed 
solutions influence environmental attitudes, behavior change, and policy support (Cantrill 
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1993; Davis 1995; Spence and Pidgeon 2010; Lakoff 2010; Nisbet et al. 2012; Bertolloti and 
Catellani 2014). However, limited research evaluates the effectiveness of message frames 
focused specifically on how benefits to human economic activity or to the ecological system 
affect public support for that policy. 
Economic message frames promote environmental management based on economic 
co-benefits to humans. Economic issues are much more immediately concerning to most 
Americans than environmental issues are (Gallup 2017). Historically, about 1-5% of 
Americans cite environmental issues as the Most Important Problem facing the nation. In 
comparison, the percentage of people who cite the economy as the nation’s Most Important 
Problem has never dipped below 20%, and during times of economic crisis has crept as high 
as 80% (Gallup, 2017; Daniels et al. 2012). Use of economic frames therefore has the 
capacity to link an otherwise relatively unimportant issue to an extremely important issue in 
the public’s consideration. Economic frames also provide an opportunity to broaden 
perceived benefits of environmental protection, increasing the number of people receptive to 
these policies. Economic frames also frequently emphasize that environmental protection 
offers opportunities instead of requiring sacrifices (Vezirgiannidou 2013). The language of 
risk, guilt, and sacrifice is typically ineffective for both eliciting positive opinions about 
environmental policies and motivating action in support of them, particularly among political 
conservatives and others not typically inclined to support those policies (Markowitz and 
Shariff 2012; Bain et al. 2012). For all of these reasons, reframing environmental issues 
based on their economic consequences can be highly effective for promoting environmental 
protection. 
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Ecological messages promote environmental protection based on its direct benefits to 
nature. Ecological messages rely on normative biospheric values (i.e. the belief that nature is 
valuable in and of itself); while research makes clear that many people value nature and 
develop environmental attitudes based on those values (e.g. Heberlein 1972; Stern and Dietz 
1994; Schultz and Zelezny 1998; Schultz 2001; Bamberg and Moser, 2007), the effectiveness 
of messages highlighting strictly ecological benefits is not well understood. Arguments 
against nature-focused environmental messaging argue that because people are more 
concerned with economic issues broadly, messaging to promote environmental protection 
should highlight economic advantages of doing so. However, in some cases trying to identify 
ways that environmental protection helps people rather than nature can diminish the 
perceived urgency of environmental issues (Vezirgiannidou 2013). In addition, if 
environmental protection is perceived not as an end in itself but rather as a means of 
promoting economic growth, then environmental management programs face comparisons to 
other economic growth policies and their perceived importance may be degraded, both 
politically and in the eyes of the public. 
Modifying Outcome Frames: Impacts as Gains or Prevention of Losses 
Outcome frames present benefits of environmental management goals in terms of 
preventing losses or facilitating gains.20 For example, removal of an invasive species can be 
interpreted as providing opportunities for native species to reestablish and increase their 
numbers or to avert further damages to the same native species. Expectations regarding how 
people will react to gain and loss messages are rooted in prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979, 1984; Levin et al. 1998; Spence and Pidgeon 2010). Prospect theory proposes 
																																								 																				
20 Elsewhere, outcome frames may be called equivalency frames or valence frames (see e.g. Druckman 2004). 
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that people are more responsive to potential losses than equivalent potential gains – the 
psychological effect of losing $100 is greater than the effect of gaining $100. Outcome 
frames influence decision-making and policy opinions by altering the accessibility and 
salience of two otherwise equivalent pieces of information, which occurs passively and 
unconsciously (Jou, Shanteau, and Harris 1996; Higgins and King 1981; Druckman 2004). 
The present research diverges from traditional prospect theory in that we evaluate whether 
people respond to gains and losses of public goods. This represents a significant departure in 
that the psychological drivers of responses to gain and loss. The greater psychological impact 
of losses, as well as resultant risk-seeking behavior in the face of losses and risk-averse 
behavior in the face of gains, may not be nearly as powerful when those gains and losses are 
not borne directly by the decision-maker. 
Existing work on the effects of gain and loss frames provide inconsistent evidence for 
how they influence environmental attitudes and behaviors. Loss frames tend to be more 
effective for increasing concern or behavior for a number of environmental issues (Davis 
1995; Novemsky and Kahneman 2005; Cobb 2005; Loroz 2007; Hardisty and Weber 2009; 
White, MacDonnell and Dahl 2011; for a review see Cheng et al. 2011). Loss frames increase 
the salience and perceived consequences of policy issues more than commensurate gain 
frames (Meyerowitz and Chaiken 1987; Cheng et al. 2011). The result is that loss frames are 
most effective at influencing opinions related to low-salience issues (Obermiller 1995; Cheng 
et al. 2011). Gain frames, however, may be more effective at influencing opinions related to 
high-salience environmental issues (Obermiller 1995; Cheng et al. 2011). This is consistent 
with findings that gain frames are better than loss frames when attempting to influence 
opinions regarding climate change policies (Spence and Pidgeon 2010; Gifford and Comeau 
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2011; Segev et al. 2015; Bain et al. 2012). The already high salience of climate change 
relative to other environmental issues may mean that communications do not significantly 
benefit increases salience. In addition, loss frames related to climate change lead people to 
feel demoralized by the scope of the problem (Feinberg and Willer 2011), while gain frames 
lead to more optimistic perspectives on our ability to address the problem. 
People may also respond to gain and loss frames for certain environmental issues or 
policies differently based on how they perceive policy risk. People tend to be risk-averse 
when confronting potential gains and risk-seeing when trying to avoid potential losses 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). When evaluating policy issues or candidates, this generally 
manifests as preference for the status quo (Quattrone and Tversky 1984). Under the status 
quo people know what to expect, while the alternative choice is unknown; even if the 
alternative may be as likely to lead to new benefits as to new losses, those potential losses 
would have a larger psychological effect. However, when faced with potential significant 
losses, for example if people are told that maintenance of the status quo may actually lead to 
significant losses, they will be more willing to take risks (e.g. support the challenger, or new 
environmental policies) in order to prevent those losses. One possible reason loss frames do 
not effectively motivate changes to behavior or attitudes regarding climate change is that 
inaction in the face of climate change is perceived as highly risky (Spence and Pidgeon 2010; 
Weitzman 2009; Costello et al. 2010) while enacting policies to mitigate climate change is 
perceived as more cautious. Gain frames are most likely to motivate risk-averse choices, 
which in the case of climate change is policy action. 
Using Message Frames to Promote Invasive Species Management 
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This study evaluates the impacts of message frames on support for environmental 
management using a case of invasive species management in California. Like many 
environmental problems, invasive species pose major economic and ecological threats (Mack 
et al. 2000; Simberloff et al. 2005). Invasive species are a significant driver of global 
biodiversity loss (Sala et al. 2000). As of the late 1990s, 400 of the 958 listed endangered 
species in the United States are primarily at risk due to species invasion (Wilcove et al. 1998; 
Sala et al. 2000). Invasive species also have significant economic impacts such as damage to 
private and public property and destruction of crops, fisheries, and other commercial 
agricultural products. Invasive species also hinder delivery of ecosystem services that 
contribute to human economic activity. As of 1993, invasive weeds alone were estimated to 
cause direct costs of $3.6-5.4 billion USD per year (Office of Technology Assessment, 
1993), a number that is likely much larger now. Species invasion is also occurring at 
increasing frequency across the world, and as globalization and trade continue to accelerate 
in tandem with climate change it is likely that both the economic and ecological 
consequences of species invasions will become larger and more politically contentious 
(Hellmann et al. 2008).  
Invasive species management is a useful case to test framing effects on public opinion 
both because it has large economic and ecological consequences, and because similarities to 
other environmental issues mean that lessons learned in how to frame invasive species 
management may be transferable to other environmental issues. Invasive species 
management is not prominent in current national partisan rhetoric, which means that it is a 
relatively non-partisan issue (Dunlap et al. 2001; Feygina, Jost, and Goldsmith 2010). For 
highly politicized issues, party cues can overwhelm individuals’ own policy considerations, 
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leading them to make decisions based on their political or social identities and the perceived 
identities of the entity delivering the message (Cohen, 2003; Kahan 2012; Kahan et al. 2012; 
Goren et al. 2009; Slothuus and De Vrees 2010). Because the public does not hold strong 
opinions regarding invasive species management, communications can influence those 
opinions to a greater extent than they can for highly politicized issues like climate change.  
Though opinions on invasive species may be weakly held or non-existent, most 
Americans maintain at least passing familiarity with environmental conservation issues 
broadly (Speth 2008; Daniels et al. 2012; Sharp et al. 2011; Bremner and Park 2007). 
Moreover, the fact that the public understands invasive species issues poorly and does not 
hold strong opinions on how government should address invasive species (Simberloff et al. 
2005; Moser et al. 2009; Bremner and Park 2007; Bertolino and Genovesi, 2003) makes it 
more like most policy issues, including environmental issues, rather than less (Zaller 1992; 
Smith 2001). The increasing visibility of arguments regarding the economic value of 
ecosystem services and natural capital frame environmental management as an economic 
concern (Costanza et al. 2017; Daily 1997), which increases the likelihood the public is at 
least somewhat familiar with both ecological and economic benefits of environmental 
management. This base recognition can be important, as people with more political 
information tend to be more responsive to policy frames (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Miller 
and Krosnick 2000). 
Framing Invasive Species Management: Economic and Ecological Messages 
Evaluating the efficacy of messages highlighting economic or ecological benefits of 
invasive species management provides important insight for communications related to other 
environmental issues as well. Most studies regarding how people respond to economic and 
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environmental frames focus on public attitudes related to climate change. Though climate 
change is a hugely important issue, public debate is hindered by pervasive, ineffective 
frames, most notably the pollution frame, which leads to ongoing debate over the science of 
climate change rather than the benefits associated with addressing the issue (Vezirgiannidou 
2013). The ineffectiveness of existing climate frames provides opportunities for significant 
improvements from re-framing climate change in a way that highlights co-benefits, in 
particular economic benefits. However, for environmental issues like invasive species 
management, a lack of dominant existing frames means messages focused on the ecological 
importance of managing invasive species or other less politicized issues are unlikely to elicit 
hyper-partisan responses that make people defensive and cause them to “dig in” in response 
to a common opposition frames. 
The means and goals of managing invasive species or similar environmental issues 
may also be an important factor determining how people respond to ecological and economic 
message frames. Highlighting the economic value of invasive species management may be 
perceived as unpalatable or even unethical if people believe animals are being harmed for the 
purpose of human greed (Sacchi et al. 2014; Sandel 2012). By focusing on how protecting 
the environment benefits humans, less attention is paid to the intrinsic value of a healthy 
environment. Although considerations regarding harm to animals may be unique to invasive 
species management, many environmental issues involve psychological or material tradeoffs 
between human and ecological benefits, and individuals’ beliefs and values will help dictate 
how they respond to these tradeoffs (Stern and Dietz 1994; Stern 2000; Dunlap et al. 2000; 
Dietz et al. 2005; Dietz et al. 2007).  
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As a result, different people will interpret and respond to economic and ecological 
message frames differently. Conservatives are typically more responsive to messages 
highlighting economic benefits, while liberals are more responsive to messages that highlight 
ecological benefits (Clifford and Jerit 2013; Bain et al. 2012). The roots of this discrepancy 
lie in different moral systems. Conservatives subordinate nature to the will of people who 
desire to use it for their own ends and believe in market-based systems that evaluate the value 
of the natural environment for its human use rather than its intrinsic value (Lakoff 2010; 
Markowitz and Shariff 2012; Feygina et al. 2010). The progressive moral system, on the 
other hand, is based on empathy and feelings of responsibility toward others (Lakoff 2010). 
Liberals tend to value caring for and protecting others, including non-human species 
(Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Schwartz et al. 2010). As a result, liberals and Democrats 
are more likely to believe protecting the environment is a moral responsibility (Feinberg and 
Willer 2012; McCright and Dunlap 2011), which also makes them more likely to reject 
economic arguments for environmental protection (Sacchi et al. 2014). The result is that 
liberals should be more responsive to frames that highlight the ecological benefits of 
environmental policies, while conservatives are more responsive to frames highlighting 
economic benefits. This leads to two hypotheses: 
H1: Among liberals, ecological frames will increase support for invasive species 
management more than economic frames. 
 
H2: Among conservatives, economic frames will increase support for invasive species 
management more than ecological frames. 
 
Overall, we anticipate that messages explaining economic and ecological benefits of 
invasive species management will each increase support for invasive species management. 
This leads to a third hypothesis: 
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H3: Overall, people will be more supportive of invasive species management when 
framed as providing ecological or economic benefits, as compared to a control 
message. 
 
Finally, people’s environmental orientations may play an important role in 
determining how they respond to different messages related to invasive species management. 
The dissonance associated with harming animals to help human economic growth may be 
particularly strong among environmentalists, and thus the opportunities to minimize that 
dissonance through promoting ecological benefits will also be greater. More generally, 
people with strong environmental attitudes tend to reject economic arguments for 
environmental protection. This is true even when benefits of a policy are presented as a “win-
win” for both (Sacchi et al. 2014), because environmentalists are more likely to perceive 
environmental protection as an issue of moral right and wrong and thus one for which co-
benefits may be perceived not just as unimportant but inappropriate. This same rejection of 
economic arguments for to promote invasive species management is not expected of people 
who do not feel deeply concerned about the environment. This leads to two additional 
hypotheses: 
H4: Among environmentalists, ecological frames will increase support for invasive species 
management more than economic frames. 
 
H5: Among non-environmentalists, economic frames will increase support for invasive 
species management more than ecological frames. 
 
Framing Invasive Species Management: Gain and Loss Messages 
 
Evaluation of how the public responds to messages that highlight proposed gains 
versus prevented losses can provide essential insight regarding how prospect theory applies 
broadly to environmental public goods problems. Existing research regarding the impacts of 
gain and loss frames on environmental attitudes and behavior offer mixed results based on 
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public perceptions of the specific environmental issue evaluated. One way that gain and loss 
frames influence policy opinions is that they can impact issue salience, with loss-prevention 
frames typically increasing salience more than comparable gain-oriented frames (Meyerowitz 
and Chaiken 1987; Cheng et al. 2011). Because invasive species management is not a highly 
salient issue for most Americans, the opportunity for significantly increasing concern for and 
awareness of the issue means that loss frames may be particularly effective at influencing 
support for invasive species management. 
Gain and loss frames also influence policy opinions differently based on how people 
understand the relative risk of policy action to address that issue (Rothman et al. 2006; 
Spence and Pidgeon 2010). Because people are risk-seeking when confronting potential 
losses and risk-averse regarding gains, “where an outcome frame is construed as low in risk, 
there is a systematic advantage when framing information about outcomes in terms of gains” 
(Spence and Pidgeon 2010: 27). The alternative is also true: when an outcome is perceived as 
high-risk, loss frames should be more effective at encouraging opinion change or action. 
Inaction with respect to invasive species appears a priori to be a riskier choice than non-
action, because inaction is likely to lead to large ecological and economic damages (Keller et 
al. 2008; Keller et al. 2009; Pejchar and Mooney 2009). However, new policy action will 
generally be considered riskier than the status quo. That may not be the case with climate 
change mitigation because people have a reasonable understanding of the issue. 
Comparatively, the threats posed by most invasive species are both misunderstood and 
ignored. As a result, we expect that most people will maintain a conventional perception of 
new invasive species policy action as the riskier choice.  
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Based on evaluation of both perceived risks and salience of the invasive species issue, 
we anticipate that people will be more likely to support the project when framed in terms of 
potential losses avoided. This leads to our next hypothesis. 
H6: People will be more supportive of invasive species management when presented 
in terms of preventing economic or ecological losses than in terms of offering 
comparable economic or ecological gains. 
 
We do not anticipate significant differences in treatment effects among subgroups 
based on outcome frames. There is evidence that conservatives and Republicans are more 
responsive to gain-framed messages than to loss-framed messages (Feinberg and Willer 
2011; Markowitz and Shariff 2012; Bain et al. 2012). However, this is likely an artifact of 
backlash associated with partisan rhetoric rather than a natural predisposition to respond to 
gain frames rather than loss frames. Given the non-partisan nature of invasive species 
management, we do not anticipate political affiliations to substantially influence response to 
gain and loss frames. 
Effects of Covariates on Support for Invasive Species Management 
 When estimating support for invasive species management, we measure a number of 
covariates that we expect may have an effect on support for invasive species management. 
Both political ideology and environmental orientation are measured and used to evaluate 
heterogeneous treatment effects, as described in detail in the two sections above. We also 
measure support for animal welfare, gender, age, income, education, and race. Environmental 
public opinion research suggests these characteristics may influence support for invasive 
species management. Liberals and Democrats are typically more supportive of pro-
environmental policies than conservatives and Republicans. However, majorities of both 
parties tend to offer broad support to the goals of the environmental movement (Daniels et al. 
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2012), and how political ideology and partisan identity impact invasive species management 
specifically is unclear. People who are more concerned about the environment also tend to be 
more supportive of pro-environmental policies (Dunlap and Van Liere 1980; Dunlap et al. 
2000; Daniels et al. 2012).  
 Younger people, women, wealthier people, and better educated people are all often 
more supportive of environmental policy support (for a review see Daniels et al. 2012; Jones 
and Dunlap 1992; Van Liere and Dunlap 1980; Dietz et al. 2007). However, how each of 
these translates from general environmental policy support to invasive species management 
is unclear. For example, women are often cited as more supportive of pro-environmental 
policies in part because they are more nurturing than men (Davidson and Freudenberg 1996). 
However, invasive species management involves removal or eradication of species, 
something likely misaligned with a nurturing disposition. Members of different races do not 
have consistent differences of opinion regarding environmental policy positions (Mohai and 
Bryant 1998; Daniels et al. 2012). In cases when race has been found to be a significant 
predictor of environmental policy support, people of color tend to be more likely to support 
pro-environmental policies than whites (Jones and Dunlap 1992; Whittaker, Segura, and 
Bowler 2005). 
Data and Methods 
Procedure 
We recruited a sample of Californians (N=1077) using an online panel provided by 
Qualtrics. The survey was fielded from February 22 to March 16, 2017 using online quota 
sampling, which allowed us to gather a sample of California residents that was representative 
of the state population on household income and political party affiliation measures. We also 
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used quotas to oversample rural residents as part of a separate analysis that will not be 
discussed in detail in this paper. The age of participants also closely approximated the 
California population, while the sample overrepresented women, better educated residents, 
and white residents. A complete review of sample demographic characteristics is available in 
the appendix.  
Several considerations led to the choice to field the survey in California rather than 
the nation as a whole. First, we expected that public opinion regarding the federal 
government would be significantly more hostile among certain respondents than regarding 
state-level environmental management agencies, and we were interested in opinions that 
were not strictly reflective of larger political or partisan issues. Second, state agencies often 
address issues like invasive species, which made it appropriate to highlight the work of a 
state agency. Finally, California is a large, highly diverse state where management of 
invasive wild pigs is a serious issue. Though California is more politically liberal, more 
urban, and more racially diverse than the US as a whole, by using quota sampling and 
controlling for these variables, we believe we are able to successfully isolate effects 
associated with unique characteristics of California. 
The survey experiment began by measuring a number of covariates including 
participants’ demographic information, political beliefs and affiliations, values, and 
environmental attitudes. Next, participants were randomly assigned to read one of five 
descriptions of a proposed invasive species management project in California. They were 
told that the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) was considering moving 
forward with a proposal to manage and ultimately eradicate invasive wild pigs (Sus scrofa), 
and that they would like to know more about the public’s opinions on such a project. The five 
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press releases included four treatment messages that used a full factorial 2 (target frame: 
ecological vs. economic) x 2 (outcome frame: gain vs. loss) design. A fifth control condition 
provided participants with information regarding CDFW’s planned implementation of the 
project, but excluded discussion of ecological or economic impacts of the project. We 
modeled the fictitious press releases after real CDFW communications regarding invasive 
species. After reading the press release, participants were asked whether they support or 
oppose the project, and how strongly they hold this position. Responses to these questions are 
our primary outcome measures. Participants were provided debriefing information and the 
survey experiment was completed. Several attention checks were used throughout the survey 
experiment. Responses from any participant who spent less than 33% or more than 300% of 
mean survey response time was excluded. In addition, two separate control questions were 
used in which participants were asked to click a specific multiple choice option. Participants 
who failed either attention check question were excluded. 
Measures 
Message Frames. Four treatment messages were randomly assigned to participants in 
the form of different press releases from the California Department of Fish and Wildlife 
(CDFW). Messages held all language constant other than the expected results from 
implementation of the management program or failure to do so. Message frames differed in 
each treatment condition and included the following: 1) ecological gain treatment: 
highlighted benefits to native California ecosystems and species that would result from 
implementation of the pig management program; 2) ecological loss treatment: highlighted  
further loss of native habitat and species destruction if CDFW fails to implement the 
management program; 3) economic gain treatment: highlighted increase in statewide 
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economic production and government tax revenue that would result from implementation of 
the management program; 4) economic loss treatment: highlighted continued loss of 
economic production and government tax revenue that would result from failure to 
implement the management program. The primary differences among these four conditions 
occurred at the end of each project description. The control message used all of the same 
language as each of the treatment messages, but did not references expected outcomes of the 
wild pig management project. The language from each fictional press release is provided in 
the appendix. 
 Support for invasive species management. The primary dependent variable used in 
analysis is support for the wild pig management project described in each message frame. To 
increase the perceived importance and personal connection to the question, participants were 
asked “As a California resident, do you support or oppose the proposal…” Responses were 
initially measured as binary (support/oppose) and participants were subsequently asked about 
their strength of support or opposition. Strength of support for the project is used as a 
secondary dependent variable. Participants who supported the project were asked how strong 
their support the project, with response options including “strongly support,” “support,” and 
“only slightly support,” while opponents of the project were asked how strong that opposition 
was, with options including “strongly oppose,” “oppose,” and “only slightly oppose.” For 
analysis, we then coded these responses into a single ordinal measure of strength of support, 
from “strongly oppose” (1) to “strongly support” (6). 
 Manipulation checks. We asked participants several questions to measure whether 
treatments effectively influenced their thinking about the project. First, we asked whether 
wild pigs primarily present a problem to California because of their economic or ecological 
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consequences. Results show a significant difference in response choice based on ecological 
or economic treatment frame (c2(8) = 167.46, p<.01). Participants who received an 
ecological treatment were then asked whether the program would “prevent further declines” 
or “allow for increases” in native species and habitat; participants who received the economic 
treatment were asked whether the program would “prevent further economic damages” or 
“allow additional economic benefits.” Responses were combined across the economic and 
ecological conditions, and responses differed by gain or loss outcome frame (c2(1) = 14.48, 
p<.01).  
Covariates. Environmental orientation was measured using an abridged version of 
the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP; Dunlap et al. 2000; Stern et al. 1999). Principal 
component analysis using a polychoric correlation matrix because of the ordinal nature of the 
variables revealed that the five measures were organized into a single component (five items, 
µ = 3.30, a=.64).21 We also used NEP in subgroup analysis in order to determine whether 
people who exhibit high levels of environmental concern (i.e. “environmentalists”) 
responded to treatments differently than those exhibiting low levels of environmental 
concern (i.e. “non-environmentalists”). For subgroup analyses we used a median split, 
defining environmentalists as those with NEP scores in the top half and non-
environmentalists as those with NEP responses in the bottom half. Political ideology was 
included in models to account for possible influences of general political beliefs about 
government on support for a government program like invasive species management 
measured on a seven-point Likert scale, from “extremely liberal” (1) to “extremely 
conservative” (7). To evaluate subgroup effects by political ideology, we subset participants 
																																								 																				
21 Results from this factor analysis are shown in the appendix to Chapter 2. 
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into liberals, conservatives, and moderates. Liberals are defined as anyone who responded 
they were “extremely liberal,” “liberal,” or somewhat liberal on the Likert scale (1-3). 
Conservatives are defined as participants who self-identified as “extremely conservative,” 
“conservative,” or “somewhat conservative” on the Likert scale (5-7). Finally, moderates 
indicated they were “moderate; middle of the road” on the scale (4). 
Several other variables were used as controls but are not the subject of detailed 
analysis. Concern for animals’ well-being was measured via a series of questions which we 
used to construct a single measure (four items, Cronbach’s a=.61). Party identification was 
measured by asking whether participants identify as a Democrat, Republican, 
Independent/Unaffiliated, or Other.  Education was measured by asking participants to 
identify their highest level of education achieved, from “Did not finish High School” (1) to 
advanced degrees (8). Annual household income was measured on an ordinal scale from 
“Less than $20,000” to “Over $150,000.” The survey matched household income quotas that 
were consistent with existing U.S. Census information for California residents. Information 
on participants’ race/ethnicity, gender, age, and whether they live in a rural or urban 
environment were also measured and included in the models described below. 
Results 
Support for Invasive Species Management 
We began analysis by estimating the effects of treatment assignment on support for 
the wild pig management project by specifying a logistic regression model that included 
treatment assignment and covariates. Predicted probabilities of support for the pig 
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management program for each treatment condition and for changes across two covariates that 
had a significant effect on support are all shown in Table 1.22 
 
Both ecological gain and ecological loss frames had positive and significant effects 
on support for invasive species management, as compared to the control. Neither of the 
economic frames had a significant effect on project support, though in both cases the 
direction of the effect was positive. Only two covariates – concern for animal welfare and 
gender – had a significant effect on support for the project. People who were more concerned 
about animal welfare were less supportive of the project, likely because they find the 
prospect of killing animals to be unacceptable. Men were more supportive of the project than 
women, which is consistent with existing invasive species opinion research (Fitzgerald et al. 
2007; Bremner and Park 2007). 
																																								 																				
22 Results of a full logistic regression can be found in the appendix. 
Table 3.1: E↵ects of Message Frames on Support for Wild Pig Management
Treatment/Covariate Predicted Probability ATE/  N
Treatment Condition
Control .68 - 218
Ecological Loss .87 19pp⇤ 215
Ecological Gain .79 11pp⇤ 217
Economic Loss .76 8pp 216
Economic Gain .73 5pp 211
Animal Welfare Support
Low Support .80 - 275
High Support .72  8pp⇤ 269
Gender
Female .69 - 687
Male .83 14pp⇤ 390
Results are predicted probabilities of support for the project. ATE is the change in the predicted
probability of support for the project between the treatment condition and control, represented
as percentage point (pp) change. For animal welfare and gender, treatments are excluded. In
a logistic regression, animal welfare is included as a continuous variable and has a significant
e↵ect at p<.05. However, to show change in predicted probability, we construct high- and
low-support measures with the top and bottom quartiles of respondents.
⇤ E↵ect is significant at p<.05 in logistic model
Table 3.2: E↵ects of Pooled Treatments on Support for Wild Pig Management
Treatment (Pooled) Predicted Probability ATE N
Control .68 - 218
Ecological Treatments .83 15pp⇤ 432
Economic Treatm nts .74 6pp 427
Loss Treatments .82 14pp⇤ 426
Gain Treatments .76 8pp⇤ 433
Results are predicted probabilities of support for the project. ATE is the change
in predicted probability of support between the treatment condition and control,
presented as percentage point (pp) change.
⇤ E↵ect is significant at p<.05 in logistic model
1
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 Pooled effects of each treatment condition are shown in Table 2. Support for the 
invasive species management project differed significantly by attribute frame (c2(4) = 29.22, 
p<.001), which highlighted ecological or economic consequences of the program. H3 
proposed that overall support for invasive species management would increase given either 
ecological economic message frames, as compared to a control frame that does not highlight 
these impacts. Post-hoc analysis revealed that ecological frames, but not economic ones, had 
a significant and positive effect on support for the project when compared to the control. 
People who read the ecological message were more supportive of the invasive species 
management project than either people who read the control message (Kruskal-Wallis c2(1) = 
21.45, p<.001) and as compared to the economic message (K-W c2(1) = 10.16, p=.004).23 
Support for the wild pig management program did not differ significantly between the 
economic frame and the control frame (K-W c2(1) = 3.66, p=.17).24 
 
Outcome frames, which highlighted expected gains or avoided losses, also had a 
significant effect on participants’ support of the project (c2(2) = 19.52, p<.001). Support for 
																																								 																				
23 When referencing comparisons of effects of different treatments to one another, we use a Bonferroni 
correction to p<.05. When p-values are reported, they are Bonferroni-adjusted. 
24 Full regression results for pooled treatments can be found in the appendix. 
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Loss Treatments .82 14pp⇤ 426
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Results are predicted probabilities of support for the project. ATE is the change
in predicted probability of support between the treatment condition and control,
presented as percentage point (pp) change.
⇤ E↵ect is significant at p<.05 in logistic model
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the project was significantly greater among people who read the loss frames than in the 
control frame (Kruskal-Wallis c2(1) = 19.21, p<.001). Loss frames were also significantly 
more effective at increasing support (Kruskal-Wallis c2(1) = 6.95, p<.05). Thus, the null 
hypothesis for H6 can be rejected – loss frames are more effective than gain frames across 
the entire sample. In the logistic model cited above, gain frames also had a positive effect on 
project support as compared to the control message. However, when controlling for family-
wise error, the effect of gain frames does not remain significant (Kruskal-Wallis c2(1) = 4.64, 
p=.09).  
Together, these results indicate that messages highlighting the ecological impacts 
associated with invasive species management increase support among participants more than 
economic frames, and that people are more responsive to messages highlighting opportunities 
to prevent further losses than messages highlighting comparable gains. Moreover, the 
interaction between ecological and loss frames had a far larger effect than any other message 
used in the survey experiment. 
Understanding not just whether different messages lead to increased support but also 
whether messages significantly increase how strongly people feel about an issue provides an 
important test of how these different messages might influence policy outcomes. Strength of 
support can inform how salient the issue feels for people, and therefore how likely their 
opinion on the issue is to influence their political behavior (Krosnick and Abelson 1992). To 
evaluate the effects of different messages on strength of support, we specified an ordered 
logistic regression with the same predictors as the models used to produce predicted 
probabilities of support shown in Table 1.25 Odds ratios for each response option in each 
																																								 																				
25 Full ordered logistic models can be seen in the appendix. 
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message condition are shown in Table 3, and indicate that the effect of different message 
frames on strength of support for the project reflect their effects on overall support. 
 
As with the logistic regression modeling overall support, ecological loss and 
ecological gain frames both had positive and significant effects on strength of support for the 
project described in the messages. Results are presented as odds ratios, which can be 
interpreted as the increased likelihood of being one position higher in terms of strength of 
support as a result of treatment, as compared to the control group. Thus, the odds ratio of 
2.01 for the ecological loss message means participants who received the ecological loss 
message were over twice as likely to have indicated "strongly support" than "support" (or to 
have indicated “support” rather than “neutral”), as compared to the control. The results 
presented in Table 3 provide additional evidence that ecological messages are more effective 
than economic ones for changing opinion regarding invasive species management. 
Treatment-by-Covariate Heterogeneous Effects 
 Next we evaluated how different message frames influenced support for invasive 
species management among subgroups of participants, including among people with different 
political ideologies and people with strong or weak environmental orientation (i.e. 
“environmentalists” and “non-environmentalists”). Among liberals, assignment to different 
Table 3.3: E↵ects of Message Frames on Strength of Support for Wild Pig
Management
Message Frame Odds Ratio Standard Error p-value
Ecological Loss 2.01⇤ .20 <.001
Ecological Gain 1.51⇤ .20 .04
Economic Loss 1.18 .20 .42
Economic Gain 0.99 .20 .96
Reported results are odds ratios.
⇤ significant at p<.05
2
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messages had a significant effect on support for wild pig management (c2(4) = 24.96, 
p<.001), with ecological loss treatments increasing project support the most as compared to 
the control, followed by ecological gain and economic gain treatments. Treatment 
assignment did not have significant effects on conservatives’ (c2(4) = 6.82, p=.44). However, 
support for the project did differ by treatment condition for self-described moderates (c2(4) = 
14.66, p<.05).26 Support for the project differed significantly by treatment condition among 
environmentalists (c2(4) = 19.80, p<.001) and among non-environmentalists (c2(4) = 16.01, 
p<.01). 
 We also pooled treatments to evaluate the effects of different types of messages 
among different groups. Figure 1 shows effects of pooled treatments based on respondents’ 
ideology. For liberals, ecological treatments have a large and positive effect on project 
support, but economic treatments have no effect. This indicates that regarding H1, which 
proposed that liberals would be more responsive to ecological frames than economic frames, 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. Among conservatives, those who received the economic 
treatment were significantly more likely to support the project, while those who received the 
ecological treatment were not more likely than those conservatives who read the control  
message. Thus, for H2, which proposed that conservatives would be likely to support the 
project if they read an economic message, the null can also be rejected. Among moderates, 
the ecological message significantly increased support, while the economic message had no 
impact.27 
																																								 																				
26 Subgroup analyses were also estimated among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Those revealed 
similar results. Democratic support for the project differed significantly by treatment condition (c2(4) = 27.93, 
p<.001), with ecological loss messages having the largest effect on support. Support for the project did not 
differ by treatment condition among either Republicans (c2(4) = 4.18, p=.38) or Independents (c2(4) = 6.10, 
p=.19). Additional results by party ID can be found in the appendix. 
27 A table showing average treatment effects by ideology can be seen in the appendix. 
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Our expectations regarding the effects of gain and loss messages are also largely 
supported. Loss messages had a significant and positive effect on project support among all 
three ideological groups, while gain messages had no effect on support among any group. 
The size of the effect of loss messages was identical among conservatives and republicans, 
while the effect was slightly larger among moderates. This finding provides additional 
support for rejecting the null for H6. It also supports our expectations that gain and loss 
frames would not have differential influences on project support based on political ideology.  
Figure 2 shows average treatment effects of among environmentalists and non-
environmentalists.  
 
Figure 3.1: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, By 
Ideology 
   112 
 
 
For environmentalists, ecological messages had significant positive effects on support 
for the project, while economic messages had no significant effects on support. This supports 
expectations outlined in H4, and we can reject the null hypothesis that environmentalists will 
respond equivalently to ecological and economic frames. People who are most concerned 
with environmental protection are not only responsive to messaging that highlights 
ecological benefits; they are also indifferent toward messages highlighting economic 
benefits. Among non-environmentalists, both ecological and economic messages 
significantly increased support for invasive species management. Moreover, ecological 
messages had a slightly larger effect on project support than economic messages, which 
contradicts expectations outlined in H5. Thus, H5 is rejected – non-environmentalists were 
not more responsive to economic messages than ecological ones. As with liberals and 
conservatives, loss frames significantly increased support for invasive species management 
Figure 3.2: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, by Environmentalism 
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among both environmentalists and non-environmentalists. Gain messages, however, had no 
significant effect among either subgroup. 
Subgroup analyses among environmentalists and non-environmentalists suggest that 
while ecological messages had larger average treatment effects than economic messages 
among certain people concerned about the environment for its own sake, there was no 
equivalent backlash against these eco-centric goals among groups who would not be 
expected to care about ecological outcomes and who might perceive ecological goals as 
threatening economic growth. 
General Discussion 
 The study provides new evidence regarding how people think about and respond to 
environmental messages, as well as practical information to environmental managers seeking 
to communicate their goals. We found that ecological- and loss-framed messages related to 
an important environmental problem were more effective than either economic- or gain-
framed messages when communicating the value of invasive species management. The 
dearth of a prevailing political rhetoric for invasive species management means people are 
less likely to respond to communications by reverting to their party line. As a result, 
identifying other reasons for pro-environmental government policies (i.e. co-benefits) like 
economic growth or national security is neither necessary nor effective.  
We anticipated differences in the efficacy of ecological and economic frames based 
on political ideology and environmental orientation. The prevailing wisdom is that 
environmental communications strategies should target “smaller groups of individuals who 
are homogeneous in terms of demographics, attitudes, or other salient characteristics…to 
develop messages that specifically address the attitudinal predispositions of the target” 
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(Davis 1995: 294; Grunig 1989). To some degree, we found that messages did have different 
impacts on specific audiences. Ecological frames were significantly more effective in 
building support for the program than economic frames among both liberals and 
environmentalists, while economic frames were more effective among conservatives. 
However, while ecological messages had larger average treatment effects than economic 
messages among certain people concerned about the environment for its own sake, there was 
no equivalent backlash against these eco-centric goals among groups who would not be 
expected to care about ecological outcomes and who might perceive ecological goals as 
threatening economic growth. This suggests that ideology is a more significant cleavage in 
how people interpreted the messages than environmental attitudes, which is surprising 
finding given the lack of apparent political attention that invasive species receive. 
We also found that loss aversion influences public support for invasive species 
management more than potential gains. We expected that prevention of losses would be more 
effective than gains because highlighting losses increases the salience of issues that people 
do not have strong opinions about more than highlighting gains. The result also suggests that 
people may be more willing to support new policies if inaction is presented as likely to lead 
to losses. We caution that this result may be unique to issues that are not highly salient for 
the public or for which the public has limited information, like invasive species management. 
However, the result indicates that communications highlighting how new policies to address 
obscure or non-salient environmental problems can prevent further losses may be most 
effective, because they induce people to be more willing to take risks to prevent those losses. 
This paper represents a significant step forward in understanding how environmental 
communications can influence public opinion regarding environmental management 
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generally and invasive species in particular. Invasive species management shares 
characteristics with a broad range of environmental issues such as wildlife and ecosystem 
conservation, land use, valuation of ecosystem services, and many others in which humans 
manage the environment for both their own and ecological impacts. We expect that these 
results may be used to help inform future environmental communications research and as a 
practical resource for environmental managers and to help informing future.  
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Figure A1.1: The Structure of Basic Values28 
 
 
  
																																								 																				
28 Taken from Schwartz (2010). 
Table A1.5: E↵ects of Values on Psychological Engagement Measures
Political Interest Political Attention
(1) (2)
Universalism 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.03)
Benevolence  0.03  0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
Observations 1,353 1,301
Note: Estimates are based on OLS. They do not correspond
directly to e↵ects on each specific political behavior.
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A2.1: Factor Analysis of Schwartz Values Measures - Study 2
Altruistic Egoistic Biospheric
Altruism Question 1 0.62 0.11 0.08
Altruism Question 2 0.84 -0.06 0.04
Altruism Question 3 0.96 0.01 -0.04
Egoism Question 1 -0.16 0.32 0.03
Egoism Question 2 -0.03 0.84 -0.02
Egoism Question 3 0.04 0.82 0.01
Biospherism Question 1 0.05 0.00 0.84
Biospherism Question 2 -0.04 0.08 0.82
Biospherism Question 3 0.00 -0.06 0.94
SS Loadings 2.07 1.51 2.30
Prop Variance 0.23 0.17 0.26
Cum Variance 0.23 0.40 0.65
Prop Explained 0.35 0.26 0.39
1
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Table A2.2: Sample Demographics
Statistic Sample Statistics CA Pop. Statistics
Age
18-25 yrs 16.5% 14.2%
26-35 yrs 23.8% 19.3%
36-50 yrs 22.0% 28.7%
51-65 yrs 25.1% 23.2%
>65 yrs 16.1% 14.6%
Gender
Male 36.2% 49.7%
Female 63.8% 50.3%
Household Income
<$40,000 35.7% 33.7%
$40,000-75,000 25.1% 20.8%
$75,000-150,000 24.9% 27.3%
>$150,000 14.4% 14.0%
Education
HS Grad or Less 13.8% 38.6%
Some College 40.6% 29.1%
Bachelor’s Degree 30.6% 20.3%
Advanced Degree 15.1% 12%
Total Bachelor’s or Higher 45.7% 32.3%
Race
Non-Hispanic White 56.2% 37.8%
Hispanic 20.1% 38.8%
Asian 17.3% 14%
Black 5.9% 5.6%
American Indian 3.7% <1%
Household Location
Rural 24.1% 13%
Urban/Suburban 75.9% 87%
Party ID
Democrat 47.8% 44.8%
Republican 28% 27.3%
Independent 24.1% 23.3%
Data comes from 2010 and 2015 American Community Survey estimates, and from
the Public Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey. CA population data for age
are estimates, as age bins do not align between the ACS and our survey.
2
Table A2.3: Correlation Matrix to Evaluate Multicollinearity of NEP and Values
NEP Altruism Egoism Biospherism
NEP 1.00 - - -
Altruism 0.27 1.00 - -
Egoism -0.05 0.07 1.00 -
Biospherism 0.40 0.54 0.11 1.00
3
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Table A2.4: Non-Linear Models of Environmental Behavior - Negative Binomial
and Logistic
Environmental Communications Env Organization Demonstrate
Negative Negative Logistic
Binomial Binomial
(1) (2) (3)
Demographic Controls
Education 0.01 0.10⇤ 0.43⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.05) (0.17)
Income  0.01 0.08⇤⇤  0.08
(0.03) (0.04) (0.13)
Gender: Female 0.27⇤⇤  0.31⇤⇤  0.25
(0.11) (0.15) (0.45)
Age  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤  0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.005) (0.02)
Race: Black  0.15  0.17 0.83
(0.26) (0.43) (0.90)
Race: Latino 0.05 0.10 0.50
(0.13) (0.20) (0.61)
Race: Asian  0.08 0.31⇤ 0.89
(0.14) (0.19) (0.56)
Race: American Indian 0.20  0.56 0.50
(0.21) (0.47) (1.15)
Residency: Rural 0.11  0.02  0.68
(0.11) (0.19) (0.80)
Values
Altruism 0.32⇤⇤⇤ 0.17  0.11
(0.10) (0.14) (0.41)
Biospherism 0.22⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤ 0.70
(0.09) (0.13) (0.43)
Egoism 0.06 0.05 0.33
(0.06) (0.08) (0.25)
Attitudes
NEP 0.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.09 0.15
(0.06) (0.09) (0.28)
Ideology: Conservative  0.08⇤⇤  0.06  0.23
(0.04) (0.05) (0.16)
Political Interest 0.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.09 0.81⇤⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.08) (0.31)
Party ID: Republican  0.11  0.20  0.94
(0.17) (0.24) (0.83)
Party ID: Democrat  0.12  0.07  0.40
(0.12) (0.19) (0.57)
Constant  4.18⇤⇤⇤  4.14⇤⇤⇤  9.40⇤⇤⇤
(0.56) (0.79) (2.67)
Observations 844 844 844
Log Likelihood  753.31  474.36  90.52
✓ 4,732.14 (29,507.14) 3,908.31 (25,733.14)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,542.61 984.73 217.04
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
4
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Message Framing Treatment Language 
 
Egoism Treatment Message: 
 
Please take a minute to read through the following newspaper article, which appeared in the 
March 23rd, 2016 edition of the Minneapolis Star Tribune: 
  
The federal government’s role in addressing climate change has continued to be a topic of 
major debate among both politicians in DC and people across the country. Opponents point 
to uncertainty regarding what the future holds on the issue and the costs that would be 
involved in changing the economy in an effort to decrease fossil fuel consumption. 
  
Supporters of climate change action have focused on the impact climate change is already 
having on individuals’ ways of life. They indicate that soon each of us will be personally 
affected by climate change in some way, whether in the form of lost income from a number 
of industries that will be harmed, threats to homes from wildfire or storms, severe water 
restrictions because of drought, or something else. Some people even say they already notice 
climate change, and supporters of the legislation suggest that as time goes on each of us 
becomes more and more likely to be directly impacted in some way. They also say it is in 
every individual’s best interest to support action now in to try to address foreseen or 
unforeseen potential threats before things get significantly worse. 
 
Neither supporters nor opponents can say exactly what the outcome of the political debating 
will be. As one federal official said, “it’s either a great opportunity to show each of our 
resolve, or we will suffer major problems due to climate change, none more so than our 
children and grandchildren.” 
 
(265 words) 
 
Biospherism Treatment Message: 
 
Please take a minute to read through the following newspaper article, which appeared in the 
March 23rd, 2016 edition of the Minneapolis Star Tribune: 
  
The federal government’s role in addressing climate change has continued to be a topic of 
major debate among both politicians in DC and people across the country. Opponents point 
to uncertainty regarding what the future holds on the issue and the costs that would be 
involved in changing the economy in an effort to decrease fossil fuel consumption. 
  
Supporters of climate change action have focused on the effects it could have on the world’s 
major ecosystems including oceans, the arctic, and elsewhere. This has led many to believe 
that we are entering a period of mass extinction, with as many as half the earth's species 
going completely extinct over the next century. This could result from the catastrophic 
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collapse of many of the earth’s major circles of life, with ecosystems unable to keep up with 
the speed of change in the climate. A wide variety of species from panda bears, whose food 
supply (bamboo) is likely to be decimated by warming weather, to penguins, who need sea 
ice in order to live, are in imminent danger. Supporters of action on climate change also 
suggest that the impacts of climate change on these ecosystems will continue to get more 
extreme as time passes, and that the only way to try to rebalance the natural world is to act.  
 
Neither supporters nor opponents can say exactly what the outcome of the political debating 
will be. As one federal biologist put it, “it’s either a great opportunity to show our continued 
resolve, or we're headed toward a complete ecological disaster with massive consequences 
for species across the planet.” 
 
(289 words) 
 
Altruism Treatment Message: 
 
Please take a minute to read through the following newspaper article, which appeared in the 
March 23rd, 2016 edition of the Minneapolis Star Tribune: 
  
The federal government’s role in addressing climate change has continued to be a topic of 
major debate among both politicians in DC and people across the country. Opponents point 
to uncertainty regarding what the future holds on the issue and the costs that would be 
involved in changing the economy in an effort to decrease fossil fuel consumption. 
  
Supporters of climate change action focus their attention on the harmful impacts it is already 
having, hurting millions of people’s health, financial stability, and overall well-being. Things 
like larger storms, more severe droughts, and bigger wildfires threaten peoples’ homes as 
well as their lives. Moreover, these impacts do not affect people equally: poorer people 
around the world are also more vulnerable to being harmed by climate change, even though 
they have contributed to its cause the least. Supporters of legislation to address climate 
change have also suggested that timely action is essential, and that the only way to help 
people facing things like serious food shortages, displacement from their homes due to 
flooding, and other human catastrophes is to act now before things get much worse. 
 
Neither supporters nor opponents can say exactly what the outcome of the political debating 
will be. As one federal official said, “it’s either a great opportunity to show the continued 
resolve of the United States to help lead the world or we’re headed toward a complete human 
tragedy.” 
 
(256 words) 
 
Control Message: 
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Please take a minute to read through the following newspaper article, which appeared in the 
March 23rd, 2016 edition of the Minneapolis Star Tribune: 
 
The federal government’s role in addressing climate change has continued to be a topic of 
major debate among both politicians in DC and people across the country. Opponents point 
to our lack of knowledge about what the future holds on the issue and the costs that would be 
involved in changing the economy in an effort to decrease fossil fuel consumption. 
 
In recent weeks, politicians on both side of the aisle have continued to debate the merits of 
each of their arguments. Neither side has seemed particularly willing to concede ground on 
the issue, even as both tell voters that they are dedicated to making practical policy changes 
where appropriate. Meanwhile, while survey data from around the country does suggest that 
most people have a well formed opinion on the matter, it is also apparent that at this 
particular moment most are not paying close attention, instead focusing on political issues or 
tuning out politics altogether. With an election looming, it seems less and less likely that the 
kind of compromise that would be required will come about anytime soon. 
 
Neither supporters nor opponents can say exactly what the outcome of the political debating 
will be. As one federal official said, “We hope to get something meaningful done on the issue 
during this Congress, but so far it hasn’t quite happened as we’d hoped.” 
 
(248 words) 
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Appendix 3: Chapter Three Additional Materials 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.1: Sample Demographics
Statistic Sample Statistics CA Pop. Statistics
Age
18-25 yrs 16.5% 14.2%
26-35 yrs 23.8% 19.3%
36-50 yrs 22.0% 28.7%
51-65 yrs 25.1% 23.2%
>65 yrs 16.1% 14.6%
Gender
Male 36.2% 49.7%
Female 63.8% 50.3%
Household Income
<$40,000 35.7% 33.7%
$40,000-75,000 25.1% 20.8%
$75,000-150,000 24.9% 27.3%
>$150,000 14.4% 14.0%
Education
HS Grad or Less 13.8% 38.6%
Some College 40.6% 29.1%
Bachelor’s Degree 30.6% 20.3%
Advanced Degree 15.1% 12%
Total Bachelor’s or Higher 45.7% 32.3%
Race
Non-Hispanic White 56.2% 37.8%
Hispanic 20.1% 38.8%
Asian 17.3% 14%
Black 5.9% 5.6%
American Indian 3.7% <1%
Household Location
Rural 24.1% 13%
Urban/Suburban 75.9% 87%
Party ID
Democrat 47.8% 44.8%
Republican 28% 27.3%
Independent 24.1% 23.3%
Data comes from 2010 and 2015 American Community Survey estimates, and from
the Public Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey. CA population data for age
are estimates, as age bins do not align between the ACS and our survey.
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Table A3.2: Estimating Support for Invasive Species Management
Binary Support for the Project Strength of Support for the Project
(Logistic Regression) (Ordered Logistic Regression)
Treatments
Ecological Gain 0.57⇤⇤ 0.54⇤⇤⇤
(0.23) (0.18)
Ecological Loss 1.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.99⇤⇤⇤
(0.25) (0.18)
Economic Gain 0.23 0.24
(0.22) (0.18)
Economic Loss 0.45⇤⇤ 0.30
(0.23) (0.18)
Attitudes/Values
NEP 0.12 0.21⇤⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.07)
Animal Welfare  0.36⇤⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤⇤
(0.11) (0.08)
Political Ideology  0.04  0.01
(0.06) (0.05)
Party ID: Democrat  0.16  0.22
(0.20) (0.15)
Party ID: Republican  0.03 0.11
(0.24) (0.18)
Resources
Education  0.00  0.02
(0.06) (0.04)
Household Income  0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.03)
Demographic Controls
Gender: Female  0.72⇤⇤⇤  0.70⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.13)
Rural  0.05 0.07
(0.19) (0.15)
Race: Black  0.24  0.07
(0.39) (0.31)
Race: Latinx  0.02  0.02
(0.21) (0.16)
Race: Asian 0.36 0.11
(0.22) (0.16)
Race: Other  0.12  0.19
(0.34) (0.27)
Constant 2.84⇤⇤⇤
(0.68)
Observations 992 992
Log Likelihood  537.92
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,111.85 3,124.41
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
   154 
 
Table A3.3: Estimating E↵ects of Pooled Treatments on Project Support
Support for Invasive Species Management Project
(Logit) (Logit)
Ecological Message 0.81⇤⇤⇤
(0.20)
Economic Message 0.33⇤
(0.19)
Gain Message 0.39⇤⇤
(0.19)
Loss Message 0.75⇤⇤⇤
(0.20)
Attitudes
NEP 0.13 0.11
(0.10) (0.10)
Animal Welfare  0.38⇤⇤⇤  0.37⇤⇤⇤
(0.11) (0.10)
Political Ideology  0.04  0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Democrat  0.16  0.18
(0.20) (0.20)
Republican  0.03  0.04
(0.24) (0.24)
Resources
Education 0.001  0.001
(0.06) (0.06)
Income  0.004  0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Demographic Controls
Gender  0.72⇤⇤⇤  0.71⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.17)
Rural  0.05  0.04
(0.19) (0.19)
Race; Black  0.27  0.24
(0.39) (0.38)
Race: Latinx  0.03  0.02
(0.21) (0.21)
Race:Asian 0.37⇤ 0.38⇤
(0.22) (0.22)
Race: Other  0.11  0.08
(0.33) (0.33)
Constant 2.86⇤⇤⇤ 2.91⇤⇤⇤
(0.68) (0.68)
Observations 992 992
Log Likelihood  540.51  542.13
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,113.02 1,116.27
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A3.4: Heterogeneous Treatment E↵ects By Ideology
Treatment (Pooled) Predicted Support ATE N
Liberals
Control .70 - 83
Ecological Message .89 19pp⇤ 164
Economic Message .74 4pp 197
Loss Message .83 13pp⇤ 172
Gain Treatments .79 9pp 189
Conservatives
Control .68 - 63
Ecological Message .79 11pp 114
Economic Message .83 15pp⇤ 118
Loss Message .81 13pp⇤ 115
Gain Message .80 12pp 117
Moderates
Control .68 - 56
Ecological Message .82 14pp⇤ 125
Economic Message .74 6pp 93
Loss Message .86 18pp⇤ 117
Gain Message .69 1pp 101
Notes: Ideology was measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Moderates were
defined as people who responded ”Moderate, Middle of the Road (4);
Liberals were defined as those who responded ”Extremely Liberal,”
”Liberal,” or ”Somewhat Liberal” (1-3); Conservatives were responded
”Extremely Conservative,” ”Conservative,” or ”Somewhat Conservative” (5-7).
⇤ significant at p<.05
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Table A3.5: Heterogeneous Treatment E↵ects Among Environmentalists and
Non-Environmentalists
Treatment (Pooled) Predicted Support ATE N
Environmentalists
Control .72 - 117
Ecological Message .87 15pp⇤ 221
Economic Message .75 3pp 245
Loss Message .83 11pp⇤ 233
Gain Message .78 6pp 233
Non-Environmentalists
Control .63 - 100
Ecological Message .79 16pp⇤ 211
Economic Message .75 12pp⇤ 180
Loss Message .81 18pp⇤ 191
Gain Message .74 11pp 200
Environmentalists are defined as top half of respondents in terms in NEP.
Non-Environmentalists are defined as bottom half excluding mean.
⇤ significant at p<.05
   157 
  
Table A3.6: Heterogeneous Treatment E↵ects By Party Identification
Treatment (Pooled) Predicted Support ATE N
Democrats
Control .61 - 108
Ecological Message .85 24pp⇤ 193
Economic Message .74 13pp⇤ 214
Loss Message .83 22pp⇤ 199
Gain Treatments .76 15pp⇤ 208
Republicans
Control .70 - 60
Ecological Message .80 10pp 127
Economic Message .79 9pp 115
Loss Message .82 12pp 122
Gain Message .77 7pp 120
Independents
Control .84 - 44
Ecological Message .87 3pp 100
Economic Message .76 -8pp 85
Loss Message .84 0pp 92
Gain Message .81  3pp 93
⇤ significant at p<.05
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Chapter Three Treatment Language 
Ecological Gain Message: 
Program to Eliminate Invasive Wild Pigs in California 
For Immediate Release 
  
February 8, 2017 
  
California Department of Fish and Wildlife 
  
Wild pigs or feral pigs (Sus scrofa) were first brought to California by Spanish settlers in the 
1700s. Since then, and with many more introduction events, wild pigs have colonized almost 
every county in the state. Wild pigs are habitat generalists and occupy a variety of habitats, 
including native California grasslands, oak woodlands, and along creeks and streams.  
  
Control measures have typically been limited to hunting pigs on both public and private 
lands, requiring the purchase of one tag per animal hunted. The California Department of 
Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) does not have an active management plan for invasive wild pigs. 
However, populations have become more and more established across the state, making 
control through hunting difficult. As of 2017, wild pigs present a major threat to native 
habitats and the food supply and survival of native California species.  
  
As a result, CDFW is proposing a more rigorous approach to addressing the problem of 
invasive pigs. The proposal involves a program to trap and cull wild pig populations in every 
county in the state, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the entire wild pig population across 
the state.  
  
The Department has identified major ecological benefits associated with implementation 
of the program:    
   
• Increased populations of important native and endangered California species such as 
coastal elk that still exist and the native plants and reptiles that are eaten by wild pigs. 
• Increased oak survival, aiding in efforts to preserve iconic habitat that is home to 
many native species. 
• In total, successful implementation of the project will provide major benefits for 
nearly three dozen native California species that rely on the same food sources and 
live in the same habitats as the wild pigs. 
  
CDFW is asking Californians' for their support and input on the project before planned early-
stage implementation in Spring 2017. 
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Ecological Loss Message: 
 
Press Release: Program to Eliminate Invasive Wild Pigs in California 
For Immediate Release 
  
February 8, 2017 
  
California Department of Fish and Wildlife 
  
Wild pigs or feral pigs (Sus scrofa) were first brought to California by Spanish settlers in the 
1700s. Since then, and with many more introduction events, wild pigs have colonized almost 
every county in the state. Wild pigs are habitat generalists and occupy a variety of habitats, 
including native California grasslands, oak woodlands, and along creeks and streams.  
  
Control measures have typically been limited to hunting pigs on both public and private 
lands, requiring the purchase of one tag per animal hunted. The California Department of 
Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) does not have an active management plan for invasive wild 
pigs. However, populations have become more and more established across the state, making 
control through hunting difficult. As of 2016, wild pigs present a major threat to native 
habitats and the food supply and survival of native California species.  
  
As a result, CDFW is proposing a more rigorous approach to addressing the problem of 
invasive pigs. The proposal involves a program to trap and cull wild pig populations in every 
county in the state, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the entire wild pig population across 
the state.  
  
The Department has identified major ecological losses if the program is not implemented: 
  
• Continued decline in population numbers of important native and endangered 
California species such as coastal elk that still exist and the native plants and reptiles 
that are eaten by wild pigs. 
• Increased oak death, leading to continued destruction of iconic habitat that is home to 
many native species. 
• In total, the failure to implement the program could lead to further decline of three 
dozen native California species that rely on the same food sources and live in the 
same habitats as the wild pigs. 
  
CDFW is asking Californians' for their support and input on the project before planned early-
stage implementation in Spring 2017. 
 
(326 words) 
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Economic Gain Message: 
Press Release: Program to Eliminate Invasive Wild Pigs in California 
For Immediate Release 
  
February 8, 2017 
  
California Department of Fish and Wildlife 
  
Wild pigs or feral pigs (Sus scrofa) were first brought to California by Spanish settlers in the 
1700s. Since then, and with many more introduction events, wild pigs have colonized almost 
every county in the state. Wild pigs are habitat generalists and occupy a variety of habitats, 
including native California grasslands, oak woodlands, and along creeks and streams. 
  
Control measures have typically been limited to hunting pigs on both public and private 
lands, requiring the purchase of one tag per animal hunted. The California Department of 
Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) does not have an active management plan for invasive wild 
pigs. However, populations have become more and more established across the state, making 
control through hunting difficult. As of 2016, wild pigs present a major financial burden to 
farmers and ranchers across the state.  
  
As a result, CDFW is proposing a more rigorous approach to addressing the problem of 
invasive pigs. The proposal involves a program to trap and cull wild pig populations in every 
county in the state, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the entire wild pig population across 
the state. 
  
The Department has identified major economic benefits associated with implementation 
of the program: 
  
• $1.5 billion annual increase in the value of agricultural sales statewide by eliminating 
the major damages to private farmland. 
• Over $12 million increase in annual state revenue from the sale of hunting tags for 
other animals like deer and elk by reducing competition with pigs. 
• In total, successful implementation of the project will mean $15 billion increased 
state GDP and $120 million increase in state revenue over the next ten years. 
  
CDFW is asking Californians' for their support and input on the project before planned early-
stage implementation in Spring 2017. 
 
(308 words) 
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Economic Loss Message: 
Press Release: Program to Eliminate Invasive Wild Pigs in California 
For Immediate Release 
  
February 8, 2017 
  
California Department of Fish and Wildlife 
  
Wild pigs or feral pigs (Sus scrofa) were first brought to California by Spanish settlers in the 
1700s. Since then, and with many more introduction events, wild pigs have colonized almost 
every county in the state. Wild pigs are habitat generalists and occupy a variety of habitats, 
including native California grasslands, oak woodlands, and along creeks and streams.  
 
Control measures have typically been limited to hunting pigs on both public and private 
lands, requiring the purchase of one tag per animal hunted. The California Department of 
Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) does not have an active management plan for invasive wild 
pigs. However, populations have become more and more established across the state, making 
control through hunting difficult. As of 2017, wild pigs present a major financial burden to 
farmers and ranchers across the state.  
 
As a result, CDFW is proposing a more rigorous approach to addressing the problem of 
invasive pigs. The proposal involves a program to trap and cull wild pig populations in every 
county in the state, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the entire wild pig population across 
the state. 
  
The Department has identified major economic losses if the program is not implemented: 
  
• $1.5 billion annual loss in value of agricultural sales statewide due to continued 
damage to farm and rangeland. 
• $12 million annual state revenue lost from potential sale of hunting tags for other 
animals like deer and elk that are out-competed by pigs. 
• In total, failure to implement the project will mean $15 billion lost state GDP and 
$120 million lost state revenue over the next ten years. 
  
CDFW is asking Californians' for their support and input on the project before planned early-
stage implementation in Spring 2017. 
 
(304 words) 
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Control Message: 
Press Release: Program to Eliminate Invasive Wild Pigs in California 
For Immediate Release 
  
February 8, 2017 
  
California Department of Fish and Wildlife 
  
Wild pigs or feral pigs (Sus scrofa) were first brought to California by Spanish settlers in the 
1700s. Since then, and with many more introduction events, wild pigs have colonized almost 
every county in the state. Wild pigs are habitat generalists and occupy a variety of habitats, 
including native California grasslands, oak woodlands, and along creeks and streams.  
 
Control measures have typically been limited to hunting pigs on both public and private 
lands, requiring the purchase of one tag per animal hunted. The California Department of 
Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) does not currently have a management plan for invasive wild 
pigs. However, populations have become more and more established across the state, making 
control through hunting difficult. As of 2017, wild pigs present a major financial burden to 
farmers and ranchers across the state.  
 
As a result, CDFW is proposing a more rigorous approach to addressing the problem of 
invasive pigs. The proposal involves a program to trap and cull wild pig populations in every 
county in the state, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the entire wild pig population across 
the state. 
 CDFW is asking Californians' for their support and input on the project before planned 
early-stage implementation in Spring 2017. 
(224 words) 
  
 
 
